Human migration is a universal phenomenon and it has been taking place throughout human history. It has also been recognized as one of the basic human rights by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. The Declaration in clauses 1 and 2 of Article 13 states,

Almost all regions of the world have experienced migration of people of one type or the other caused by one or the other factors and there is hardly a region that is not affected by this phenomenon. Migration of people often takes place from those regions with higher density of population to those with less density, from those having lower level of development to those with higher level of development and from those that are conflict-ridden to those that are more peaceful and ensuring better security system for human life.

Like in other parts of the world and other parts of India, the different states in Northeast India also have experienced migration of people from outside the region at different periods of history. Tripura experienced migration of the Bengalis from Bangladesh to the extent that the indigenous tribals have been reduced to a minority status. The population of the tribals in the State was reduced from 53.16% in 1941 to 28.44%in 19811Singh, Prakash. (2006). “Bangladeshi Immigration: Are We Heading for Another Partition” in B.B. Kumar (Ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, pp. 163-174.. Besides, there has been migration of the Chakmas from Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) of Bangladesh to the State2Debbarma, P.K. and Suddhir Jacob George. (1993). The Chakmas Refugees in Tripura, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.. Similarly, in Sikkim the indigenous tribals have been over swamped by the Nepali migrants who constituted over 70% of the population of the State. Assam has had a long history of migration of people from outside particularly the Bengalis. Assam has been experiencing migration of Bengalis from erstwhile eastern part of Bengal and later East Pakistan or present day Bangladesh. Commenting on the extent of migration from East Bengal during the colonial period, C.S. Mullan, the Census Superintendent for Assam, in 1931 stated:

Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram experienced migration mainly of the Chakmas from Chittagong Hill Tract of Bangladesh. Migration of people from other parts of India or across the international borders precipitated strong ethnic reactions and anti-foreigners’ movements in the different states in Northeast India that often culminated into violent ethnic conflicts between indigenous communities and migrants.

Carved out of Assam first as an Autonomous State on April 2, 1970 and later as a full-fledged State on January 21, 1972, Meghalaya is largely a tribal inhabited state with the Khasis and Jaintias and the Garos forming the main indigenous tribes. Meghalaya is one of the Indian states that experience higher growth rate of population than the national average. As per 2011 Census Meghalaya’s decadal growth rate of population (2001-11) was 27.95% which was higher than the national growth rate which stood at 17.70%. High population growth rate in the State is often perceived by many as being contributed by migration of non-tribals from outside the state.

Defining non-tribal

Legally and technically, the term ‘non-tribal’ can be used to refer to any person or his/her descendants who have migrated to Meghalaya and belonging to those communities that are not included in the list of Scheduled Tribes in the State as provided by the Acts of Parliament. However, there is also a general but politically significant understanding of the term non-tribal. Taking the latter perspective, Charles Reuben Lyngdoh and L.S. Gassah 3Lyngdoh, C. Reuben and L.S. Gassah, (2003), “Decades of Inter-Ethnic Tension”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 48, pp. 5024-5026. use term non-tribal to

According to this definition, two categories of non-tribals in Meghalaya can be identified. First, they are those non-tribals who migrated from the plains or other parts of India; and second, they are those who migrated from other countries. Lyngdoh and Gassah, however, identified Bangladesh and Nepal as being the other countries, thereby limiting the scope of their definition. It may be noted that the term non-tribal can be applied as a description to those people who have their origin in countries besides Nepal and Bangladesh but resemble in their physical feature, dress, food habits and/or religious practices to the people of Bangladesh, Nepal or other parts of India. In spite of the limitation of the definition, it is taken as the basis of the understanding of the concept ‘non-tribal’ in this study and on its basis, the persons belonging to European races, the Africans, the Chinese, the Tibetans, the Bhutias and such other mongoloid races migrating from other countries other than Nepal are excluded from the definition of non-tribals. It is to be noted that the population of these communities in the State was insignificant. In 1961 their total population was 981 and in 1991 Census their number was registered at 765.

There has been a general tendency in the State to divide non-tribal residents into “permanent residents” and “non-permanent residents” or simply ‘Meghalayans’ and ‘non Meghalayans’. Also, it may be noted that the term permanent is used interchangeably or together with the term ‘genuine’ and it is referred loosely to those non-tribals who became the residents of the state before independence of India. This kind of categorization and description of non-tribal residents has been part of the debates and discussions in the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly, amongst the media and by political parties and pressure groups. However, there was no agreement with regard to the meaning and definition of the above terms and the criteria of identification. Moreover, these classifications and descriptions are non-official and non-legal as no policy or legal framework has been framed by any legal authority to determine who is a permanent and a non-permanent non-tribal resident in the state. It may be noted that The Meghalaya Residential Bill, 1973 passed by the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly attempted to make a clear definition of who could be considered the permanent resident in the state. According to sub-section (b) of Section 2 of the Bill, a permanent resident is defined as:

Problematizing non-tribal migration

Non-tribal migration to Meghalaya4Though Meghalaya became an autonomous state only on April 20, 1970 and a full-fledged state on 21^st January 1972, Meghalaya is used in the study to refer to those areas falling under Khasi, Jaintia Hills and Garo Hills which formed the present State of Meghalaya. has had a long history5The beginning of non-tribal migration to Meghalaya is difficult to trace, yet Hamlet Bareh points out that in the 17th Century A.D. there were female Muslim wanderers coming from the plains and who eventually became the progenitors of the Syiems of Hima Mawiang (1967, p. 11). Similarly, Bareh attributes the origin of many Khasi clans to the Muslim and the Hindu migrants coming up from the plains that he describes as wanderers. Syiem is the traditional Chief among the Khasis and Jaintias. but it was in the 1970s that it became a major political issue when a section of the indigenous tribals harboured the apprehension of being swamped demographically, culturally as well as economically by the non-tribal migrants. This problematization of non-tribal migration can be attributed to the role of the tribal educated elite across political spectrums that who “not only became politically conscious, but also could articulate their demands and grievances”6Sen Gupta, Susmita. (2005). Regionalism in Meghalaya, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. The educated elite in Meghalaya were mainly the urban based section of the society whose members drawn from among lawyers, teachers, students, and even government servants who still remained connected with the rural population7Nair, Bhaskaran M. (1993). “The Emerging Middle Class, Regional Political Parties and Regionalism in Meghalaya”. In B. Pakem (Ed.), Regionalism in India, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1993, pp. 273-279.. It is this section of the society that shoulder the task of speaking on behalf of the community and to whom the general masses turned towards for providing leadership role. Further, while these educated elite from the Khasi and Jaintia and Garo communities were exposed to western ideals, at the same time they were responsible for ethnic identity formation by raising the issue of promoting and safeguarding their respective traditions, customs and promoting their social, political and economic interests.

Even before independence, the educated elite were trying to build the consciousness of the pernicious impact of non-tribal migration though their main focus was to achieve political autonomy through which the interest of the tribals could be well protected. However, there was divergence of standpoint between those who supported the Federation of Khasi States which sought to strengthen the traditional political institutions 8Syiem, E.M.R. (1998). Ka Ri Khasi: Ka Jingthmu Ban Pynkylla Ia Ka, Shillong: E.M. Reade Syiem. and Rev. J.J.M. Nichols Roy who demanded for a separate Khasi Federated State 9P.R. Kyndiah. (2010). No Hill State No Rest, Shillong: Vesta Book Agency. under the Constitution of India. Being a member of the Constituent Assembly, Rev J.J.M. Nichols Roy further tried to pursue in the post independent period though he failed to achieve the objective. In view of the failure to accomplish this objective, the Sixth Schedule under the Indian Constitution was constructed as a conciliatory formula. However, E.M.R. Syiem who supported the Federation of Khasi States vehemently criticizes Rev J.J.M. Nichols Roy and the Sixth Schedule for empowering non-tribals and the Government of Assam to meddle with land, political and cultural rights of the indigenous tribals. Nevertheless, upon achieving separate constitutional arrangement under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, notwithstanding a limited one, the tribal educated elite began to bring in legislations to counterbalance the imminent threat posed by migration of non-tribals from the plains to the indigenous tribals’ interests on land and employment. Therefore, the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council enacted the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953 (hereinafter Land Transfer Act, 1953) and the United Khasi- Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council (Trading by Non-tribals Regulation) Act, 1954. But the Land Transfer Act, 1953 was declared ultra vires by the Guahati High Court whose ruling was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that it was beyond the constitutional mandate of the Autonomous District Councils to enact such legislation. Realizing the inadequacy of the Sixth Schedule to protect the interests of the indigenous tribals and prevent alienation of land to non-tribal migrants and being further augmented by the chauvinistic attempt of the Assamese elite to impose the Assamese culture and language over the tribals and assimilate them into the larger Assamese culture, the educated elite renewed the demand for the creation of a separate hill state. All this eventually led to the formation of Meghalaya as a separate state.

It was after achieving the objective of attaining political autonomy that the educated elite started to forcefully problematize non-tribal migration and at the same time pursued ‘sons of the soil policy’. The adoption and propagation of sons of the son policy can be described as the latest phase in the development of ethnicity in any particular ethnic group asserted after it manages to attain political autonomy and gains control wholly or partly of the state’s instruments and processes of decision making and decision implementation. It is a policy followed in which the local people are given preferences in educational, employment and political opportunities, acquisition of land and even in matters of trade and business. However, the term local people is not defined by place of birth, rather it is explained by membership of a particular ethnic, religious or linguistic group10Myron Weiner. (1978). Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. In addition to those measures already enacted by the Autonomous District Councils in the state, concrete measures were put in place by the leaders of the All Party Leaders Hill Conference (APHLC) – the party under whose leadership the hill state movement was launched, to protect the interests of the indigenous tribals from possible exploitation by non-tribal migrants. The Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Act, 1971 (hereinafter Land Transfer Act) was enacted with twin objectives of not only preventing alienation of tribal lands to non-tribals but also to reclaim the lost land.11According to Clause (I) of Section 3 of the Act, “No land in Meghalaya shall be transferred by a tribal to a non-tribal or by a non-tribal to another non-tribal except with the previous sanction of the competent authority.” Similarly, the APHLC Government was responsible for the adoption of the State Job Reservation Resolution (hereinafter State Job Reservation Policy) in early 1972 reserving 80% of State Government jobs for the Khasis and Jaintias and the Garos, thereby, leaving little scope for non-tribal residents to get employment opportunities under the State Government. The APHLC Government further made a legislative attempt to restrict migration of non-tribals through the stringent provisions of The Meghalaya Residential Permit Bill (hereafter Residential Permit Bill) passed by the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly in December 1973.12Section 4 of this Bill provides “No person who is not a permanent resident or member of Schedule Tribes resident in Meghalaya shall reside in a notified area for a period of more than four months without the previous permission of the competent authority;”However, this Bill failed to receive the assent of the President after it was reserved for his consideration by the Governor of the state.

The sons of the soil policy adopted by the APHLC Government in the 1970s assumed significance in view of the tribals’ vulnerability to being exploited by the politically and economically more advanced non-tribal population including the state machineries which largely represent the interest of the non-tribals. It may be strongly noted that the Report of the High Level Committee on Socio-Economic, Health and Educational Status of Tribal Communities of India, the tribal communities remain the most vulnerable and marginalized communities in India in spite of the existence of constitutional provisions for safeguarding their interests and that colonialism for them is yet to come to an end in spite of independence due to the nature of development pursued by the Indian State. The importance of sons’ of the soil policy is particularly true with regard to the Land Transfer Act in view of the importance of land in the lives of tribal communities. It has been observed that land plays a critical position in the lives of the tribals not only from the economic, social and political perspectives, but their very identity and existence as a distinct ethnic community depends on it .13Narzary, Victor and Bibharani Swairgary, (2015), “Tribal Lands, Identity and the State: An Overview of Conflicting Paradigms”, Journal of Tribal Intellectual Collective India, Vol.2,Issue 3, No.3, pp.24-36. Bambenze, Vital. (2012). State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2012, London, Minority Rights Group International.It is an undeniable fact that the Land Transfer Act has been able to prevent land alienation in the state though in recent years there have been incidents where tribal lands were alienated in the form of acquisition by the state government for the developmental projects in New Shillong Township which is legally permissible under the Act14Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section (4) allows transfer of land if “the proposed transfer is likely to promote the economic interests of the Scheduled Tribes in the area.” and long term lease to cement companies in different parts of the state.15There is no doubt that leasing of tribal land perse does not amount to alienation of tribal land but when the impact on the land and its future utility as a result of extraction of the mineral is taken into consideration, it amounts to alienation of land. Similarly, a study has shown that since Meghalaya attained statehood and the subsequent adoption of the Job Reservation Policy, the number of indigenous tribals holding the higher posts in the Government of Meghalaya increased over the years showing a positive correlation between job reservation and the access by the tribals to position of authority in the State.16There has been a study conducted showing that in Shillong, there was a numerical domination of tribals by the non-tribal in the field of law, higher education and higher posts in government service though the reverse order started to take place after Meghalaya became a separate State (Sen Gupta,2005, pp. 69-74).

The adoption of the sons of the soil measures and the increasing concern for the need to protect the interests of indigenous tribals by the tribal educated elite belonging to the different political parties as well as students’ organisations created an apprehension in the minds of non-tribal communities particularly the Bengalis which was the largest community among them. While participating in the discussion on the Meghalaya Transfer of Land Regulation Bill, 1971 in the state legislature, Md. Akramozamman, a non-tribal member in the State Provisional Legislative Assembly raised an apprehension that the interest of the permanent non-tribal residents was not protected. The more radical among them were furious and openly condemned and confronted such measures. For example, on the 13^th April, 1972 following the enactment of the Land Transfer Act, the local daily “Young India” whose editor was Kapila Chatterjee, in its editorial condemned the Act as ‘obnoxious’ and ‘infamous’. It further described those members of the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly responsible for the enactment of Act as “ignorant mischievous politicians” and blamed the Hill Sate People’s Democratic Party (hereafter HSPDP) and APHLC for

Similarly, the non-tribal members of the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly (MLA), P.N. Choudhury, D.N. Joshi, Jaganbandhu Barman and Md. Akramozamman who were the members of the Congress Party along with the other tribal MLAs of the Party opposed the Meghalaya Residential Bill. Section 4 of this Bill provides, “No person who is not a permanent resident or member of Schedule Tribes resident in Meghalaya shall reside in a notified area for a period of more than four months without the previous permission of the competent authority”. It was the Congress opposition that played a crucial role in the President’s withholding of his assent. The opposition of the non-tribal to the Bill might have contributed to the suspicion in the minds of the indigenous tribals on their intention and attitude towards them and this might have contributed to the growing chasm in the inter-ethnic relationship between the indigenous tribal and non-tribal communities and further complicated the matter. It may be noted that Kapila Chatterjee who according to the then Chief Minister, D.D. Pugh again took a strong posture in the editorial of the Young India against the demand of the indigenous tribals for measures to protect their identity and to prevent non-tribal migration was assaulted on March 10, 1978. Eventually stained relations led to a series of ethnic conflagration in the State beginning in 1979. Subir Bhaumik [Footnote]Bhaumik, Subir. (2009). Troubled Peripheries: Crisis of India’s North East, New Delhi, Sage Publications.[/footnote] and Nabanipa Bhattacharjee describe ethnic conflicts in the state as an act of ethnic cleansing against the non-tribal communities on the part of the indigenous tribals. But these authors come to such conclusion by looking at the problem with bias from the perspective of the non-tribals only and their sources of information come from newspapers owned and controlled by non-tribals or from the subjective experiences of non-tribals.

Problematization of non-tribal migration and anti-foreigners’ movement can be described, in the terminology used by Weiner, as a “nativist phenomenon” which represents “the response of the emerging nationalities…to internal minorities with foreign connections”. In the context of Meghalaya, the term foreigner is generally used to identify those non-tribals who migrated to the region from other parts of India or foreign countries and their descendants and are often considered as exploiters. This consideration of even fellow Indians but belonging to other cultural and linguistic groups as foreigners is not Meghalaya specific but rather it has been experienced in other parts of India as well. It may be noted that tribal communities in places like Chotanagpur region of present day state of Jharkhand, Arunachal Pradesh and other tribal areas had asserted for their native rights against the migrants at different periods. What is interesting was the existence and occurrence of native movements even in non-tribal areas of Mumbai, Hyderabad and Assam. On the basis of these historical facts, it can be argued that it is too idealistic to expect the indigenous tribals in Meghalaya to be liberal to the extent that they would need not to require any measure to protect their land, economic, socio-cultural and political rights.

The question that needs consideration is why there is a native phenomenon? Territoriality which can be defined as a sense of exclusive ownership and control of a defined space and its resources which are not only linked to physical survival but also to a complex issue of identity of a particular community could possibly facilitate an explanation. It has been argued that a number of human behaviour is linked to territorial consideration either openly or discreetly17Gold, John R. (1982), “Territoriality and Human Spatial Behaviour”, Progress in Human Geography, 6: 44, pp. 44-67. According to Fiona Armitage it is territorially that also contributes towards assertion of distinct identity of a particular group of people whether tribal or otherwise18Armitage, Fiona. (2002). “Imitating Ethnicity: Land Territoriality and Identity in a Swazi Zionist Christian Church”. In Micheal Saltman (Ed.), Land and Territoriality, Oxford: Berg, pp. 135-158.. However, there is a debate between the two schools of thought about the nature of territorial behaviour of human beings whether it is intrinsic in human physiology and analogous to animal behaviour or it is a consciously acquired and learned behaviour. John R. Gold describes this debate as a “nature-nurture controversy”. Irrespective of whether territoriality is instinctive or acquired, but it cannot be denied that it plays an important role in shaping human human behaviour. L.S. Gassah observes that the Jaintias has exhibited territoriality even among themselves and this can be dated back to the early state formation where the affairs related to the selection or election to the office of the Dolois19A Doloi is a traditional tribal chief among the Jaintias in the Elaka. of different Elakas20Elaka is a traditional political and administrative unit in Jaintia Hills. were largely the privilege of the members of the founding clans of the particular area excluding those later settling clans. From territoriality perspective one can make sense that the assertion was not essentially anti non-tribal exclusively but rather it was their genuine fear of the exercise of power over them by the other non-indigenous groups. The assertion of the non-tribal residents against their demand for measures to protect their interests made them to have a genuine fear that there was a possibility of a Tripura like situation taking place in their own land where the indigenous tribals would be dominated by the migrant non-tribals.

Factors for problematization of non-tribal migration

As stated earlier non-tribal migration had already started in the earlier centuries particularly after the British colonisation in the first half of the nineteenth century, yet it’s problematization started to take place after Meghalaya became a separate state early 1970s. Several factors may help to explain as to why the educated elite began to make non-tribal migration a major political issue in the State in the 1970s. This is partly because of the domination by the non-tribals when the tribals were placed in the then composite State of Assam and increasing alienation of tribal land especially in Shillong in view of the absence of any law prohibiting non-tribals from acquiring interest on land. Tribals led by the educated elite nurtured strong non-tribal feelings in view of the chauvinistic attempt to impose the Assamese culture and language over the tribals. It was because of their chauvinistic tendency that the Assamese were considered as the replacement of British colonial masters. In this context, it may be noted that unlike the Assamese, the British had made their contributions towards the development of tribal language and culture though such promotion of tribal language and culture was meant to serve their own colonial interests. Therefore, the educated elite during the hill state movement attributed the problems faced by the indigenous people to the rule of the outsiders which meant the non-tribals. The word outsider and the consideration of the Assamese as the replacement of British colonialism assumed special political significance because the Assamese tried to enforce their imposition on the tribals from Shillong which is the land of the indigenous tribals. Shillong at that point in time was the State capital of the then composite State of Assam. Therefore, attaining separate statehood for the tribals also implied expelling non-tribals just like the British had to leave when India attained independence.

During the Bangladesh War of 1971, Meghalaya which had a population of only 10.11 lakhs as per 1971 Census received huge number of Bangladeshi refugees numbering more than 6.6 lakhs. This inflow of refugees was further compounded by the 1971 Census report showing the rising trend of non-tribal population in the State. Moreover, the numerical outnumbering of the tribals by the non-tribals in Shillong being the State capital made the presence of non-tribals more visible and, therefore, appeared more threatening. As per the 1971 Census, non-tribals constituted 58.53% of the population of Shillong. Not only in terms of numerical strength but also in terms of employment in the Government offices and other professions such as law, higher education and possibly in other professions, it was the non-tribals who had superior position compared to tribals. The superior-inferior relationship between non-tribals and indigenous tribals had wider implications in view of the nature of the Indian state where there is discrimination, exploitation and suppression by those who are politically and economically powerful over the ordinary citizens. This superior-inferior relationship between non-tribals and tribals contributed towards the development of anti-non-tribal feelings among the tribals in the State. Moreover, during this period three regional parties – the All Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC), the Hill State People’s Democratic Party (HSPDP) and Public Demands Implementation Convention (PDIC) were competing for political space and all of them sought to attract the tribal electorate. Therefore, electoral compulsion might also have contributed towards the process of problematization of non-tribal migration to the State.21This superior-subordinate relationship between the outsiders and locals was partly responsible for Assamese-Bengali conflicts in Assam.

Problematization of non-tribal migration became acute with the emergence of the ethnic based student pressure groups that were formed in the 1970s which included the Meghalaya Students’ Union (MSU) formed in 1975 and the Khasi Students’ Union (KSU) in 1978. These pressure groups immediately after their formation began to demand for detection and deportation of foreigners 22Malngiang, Pascal (1998), “Ka Khasi Students’ Union ha kine ki 20 snem”, in Paul Lyngdoh (ed.), Souvenier: Khasi Students’ Union (KSU) 20th Anniversary Celebration 1978-1998, Shillong: pp. 122-127. The student organizations launched the movement against migration of the alleged foreigners in view of their perception that such migration did continue even after attaining statehood which they expected to end. However, it can be argued that the different student pressure group were both the product and the cause of the process of problematization of non-tribal migration.

Conclusion

Problematization of non-tribal migration in Meghalaya was a complex process with several factors being responsible. The processes of problematization of non-tribal migration may be considered by the critics of tribal’s identity politics as an act of parochialism and ethnic chauvinism, yet it cannot be denied that it had played a critical role in the attempt towards protecting the interests of the tribal communities in the State. It would be quite erroneous to allege that the educated elite initiated and pushed through the agenda to check non-tribal migration more for gaining political space than real intention to protect the interests of the tribal communities as their commitment and intention to the task was evident by the fact that they came up with a landmark Meghalaya Transfer of Land Regulation Act along with the State Job Reservation Policy in the early part of the 1970s, that is, soon after the inauguration of the Autonomous State. In the context of the Land Transfer Act, 1971 even the strongest critic against problematization of non-tribal migration among the indigenous tribals would agree of its importance to protect the interests of the tribals in the State and would agree to appreciate of the farsightedness of those responsible for its legislation. Moreover, other attempts to check non-tribal migration were made in the form of attempted legislation of Meghalaya Residential Permit Bill, 1973 and the Meghalaya Regulation of Employment Bill, 1980. The attempts made by the educated elite no doubt on the negative side of it led to the occurrence of ethnic conflicts from time to time, yet undoubtedly they had contributed to the avoiding of a situation of existential crisis where the indigenous tribals would be reduced to a minority status in their own land thereby threatening not only their identity but their very existence as happened in other parts of India such as in Tripura, Jharkhand and Assam.

References

Books and Articles

• ————————. (2015) “Transformation and Consolidation of Ethnic Identity in Arunachal Pradesh: Exploring the Role of the Educated Elite”, Journal of Political Science and Public Affairs, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp.1-5.
• Armitage, Fiona. (2002). “Imitating Ethnicity: Land Territoriality and Identity in a Swazi Zionist Christian Church”. In Micheal Saltman (Ed.), Land and Territoriality, Oxford: Berg, pp. 135-158.
• Bambenze, Vital. (2012). State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2012, London, Minority Rights Group International.
• Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa, (2015), “Shillong: A Tale of Blue Love, Mainstream”, Vol. LIII No 27. Retrieved from http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article5757.html on 16.01.2018.
• Bhaumik, Subir. (2009). Troubled Peripheries: Crisis of India’s North East, New Delhi, Sage Publications.
• Debbarma, P.K. and Suddhir Jacob George. (1993). The Chakmas Refugees in Tripura, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.
• Deepak K. Singh. (2010). Stateless in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
• Gassah, L.S. (1998), Traditional Institutions of Meghalaya: A Study of Doloi and his Administration, Delhi: Regency Publications.
• Gold, John R. (1982), “Territoriality and Human Spatial Behaviour”, Progress in Human Geography, 6: 44, pp. 44-67.
• Lyngdoh, C. Reuben and L.S. Gassah, (2003), “Decades of Inter-Ethnic Tension”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 48, pp. 5024-5026.
• Malngiang, Pascal (1998), “Ka Khasi Students’ Union ha kine ki 20 snem”, in Paul Lyngdoh (ed.), Souvenier: Khasi Students’ Union (KSU) 20^th Anniversary Celebration 1978-1998, Shillong: pp. 122-127.
• Mary F. Katzenstein, (1973), “Origins of Nativism: The Emergence of Shiv Sena in Bombay”, Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 386-399.
• Myron Weiner. (1978). Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
• Nair, Bhaskaran M. (1993). “The Emerging Middle Class, Regional Political Parties and Regionalism in Meghalaya”. In B. Pakem (Ed.), Regionalism in India, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1993, pp. 273-279.
• Narzary, Victor and Bibharani Swairgary, (2015), “Tribal Lands, Identity and the State: An Overview of Conflicting Paradigms”, Journal of Tribal Intellectual Collective India, Vol.2,Issue 3, No.3, pp.24-36.
• Nongkhlaw, Sita. (2011), Politics of Pressure Groups: A Study of Student and Youth Organisation in Meghalaya, Guwahati: DVS Publishers.
• P.R. Kyndiah. (2010). No Hill State No Rest, Shillong: Vesta Book Agency.
• Sack, D. Robert, (1983), “Human Territoriality: A Theory”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73 (1), pp. 55-74.
• Sen Gupta, Susmita. (2005). Regionalism in Meghalaya, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.
• Singh, Prakash. (2006). “Bangladeshi Immigration: Are We Heading for Another Partition” in B.B. Kumar (Ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, pp. 163-174.
• Syiem, E.M.R. (1998). Ka Ri Khasi: Ka Jingthmu Ban Pynkylla Ia Ka, Shillong: E.M. Reade Syiem.
• Syiem, Micheal. (2015, April 02). “Old wounds reopened”, The Shillong Times, p. 6.
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2000). The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Government of India and Government of Meghalaya Publications

• Census 1971, Series 13 Meghalaya, District Census Handbook, U.K. & J Hills, District.
• Census of India 1961, Volume III, Assam, Part II – C, Cultural and Migration Tables.
• Census of India 1931, Volume I.
• Census of India 1951, Volume XII, Assam, Manipur and Tripura, Part I – B.
• Census of India 1991, Series 18- Meghalaya.
• Census of India, 1991 Series 16 – Meghalaya, Part VIII (C).
• Meghalaya Legislative Assembly Proceedings (1973) Winter Session.
• The Meghalaya Residential Bill Permit, 1973 (as passed by the Assembly).

Batskhem Myrboh, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Synod College, Shillong and can be reached at bmyrboh07@gmail.com

IJDTSA Vol.3, Issue 1, No.2 pp.18 to 38, April, 2018

Lapdiang Syiem performs ’Reach out to grasp roots – I stand uprooted’.

The piece has been adapted from three poems by Esther Syiem. The performance draws strongly upon the story of U Thlen, using it as the main thread that looks into the issue of coal mining. The other story, The Man-Eating Boulder is woven in through the voice of a mother and her child. The child is at its death throes as it struggles to break free of the stone that is in the act of swallowing it, while the mother, who is bound by routine and labour, has become numbed to the cries of her child.

The last story reenacts the reemergence of the Thlen in the present scenario bringing with it the complexities of labour, migration and ownership. It is the interplay of these seemingly simplistic characters that were passed down through oral tradition that is explored. As we delve deeper into them, they present themselves as metaphors that preempt the times we live in. In this performance, they bring out the disruptive and evil force of coal mining that is slowly consuming land, economy and lives.

[DOWNLOAD] Citizen’s Report on the Unregulated Coal Mining in Meghalaya

The Going Price for Coal in Meghalaya

Withered Commons : Coal mining in Meghalaya

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The massive vertical cliff at Dawki, on the southern side of the Shillong Plateau near Cherrapunji/Sohra, is elegance made real. It divides the Indian highlands and the Bangladesh Plains, and it is a bastion of calm. I was standing on a rocky ledge watching it on a foggy morning in March this year; the cliff was still shrouded in wispy clouds.

I was there for a film shoot, as a presenter, organised by a public educational broadcasting channel from Seoul. Its members were there to shoot the interiors of Mawmluh cave, from where the Meghalayan Age was first reported – now a global rock boundary signifying a near-global drought about 4,200 years ago that destabilised ancient civilisations. In that time, oceanic and atmospheric circulation patterns were reorganised, weakening the monsoons.

In front of the camera, I didn’t need any prompts from the director to stand still while a drone flew above us, providing a bird’s eye view of the cliff. Given a choice, I would have stood there for hours taking in the grandeur of the plateau, a geological marvel that still holds many mysteries of its origin.

This was my second visit to Cherrapunji/Sohra. Last time – 17 years ago – I was chasing an earthquake that had occurred in the region in 1897. I started my journey from Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala, and when I reached Sohra, I had to buy an umbrella. Alexander Frater, who wrote the travel classic Chasing the Monsoon (1990), would say it was the only season that has moods. Caught up in that incessant rain in Sohra, I realised we had been chased and overtaken by the clouds. The rains in that year, 2003, were elemental.

This is why I was intrigued when, in March, the residents said they don’t get enough usable water despite the rains. In fact, a local geologist who had joined us said Cherrapunji/Sohra was losing its water like a sieve.

Somehow the region was water-starved over four millennia after the Meghalayan Age had concluded. Why? Are we approaching a similar period now?

Geology is all about making sense of location. The fact that the Shillong Plateau, a raised feature of the land, is located within the Himalayan foreland makes it an interesting geological riddle. The abrupt appearance of a raised continental basement with an average altitude of 1,500 meters in the proximity of the Himalaya is very curious. The only one of its kind in the world, this massive hard rock batholith with a 15-km deep basin filled with sediments on its southern side has an outsize influence on climate.

The plateau is a barrier to moisture-laden winds from the Bay of Bengal, and influences the distribution of monsoon precipitation along the eastern Himalaya. As a result of these interactions with the Indian monsoon, the plateau’s southern flank has become the wettest place on Earth.

It was once near sea level and showed itself above the water about 15 million years ago. Its surface started rising actively sometime around 4 million years ago. Its uplift reorganised the Brahmaputra’s drainage. The plateau’s topographic growth deflected the river, which previously flowed to the south, to the west by around 2 million years ago.

Vertical movement along two great faults on the uplift’s northern and southern extremities allowed it to happen. The fault on the northern side was the site of a great earthquake in 1897, which devastated the southern Assam and Shillong regions. This quake was the harbinger of modern seismological research and so there exists a large observational archive associated with it.

However, the earthquake potential of the Dawki fault, on the southern part of the plateau, remains unknown. It’s an interesting scientific question with implications for both Bangladesh and India. The bending of the foreland lithosphere under the Himalaya must be generating a considerable amount of stresses, loading the faults both at the southern and northern sides of the plateau. So the plateau’s presence of the plateau not only modulates monsoon precipitation but it may also be regulating the rate of plate convergence along the eastern Himalaya.

The region’s geological history shows us why the plateau has evolved into a dynamic entity with effects on the climate and tectonics. But there is also a serious ecological crisis brewing in the plateau that affects the region’s water budget. This is mostly due to the unsound and unscientific mining activities.

On December 13, 2018, 15 miners – mostly migrant labourers – were buried in a rat hole mine at Ksan in Meghalaya’s East Jaintia hills after it was suddenly flooded. Such accidents aren’t new in Meghalaya. In a similar accident in July 2012, another 15 miners were killed in the south Garo Hills. Their bodies were never recovered. How do you explain a flash flood in a rat hole mine? And what is the source of this water?

In the past, interactions between the land and the sea in the southern part had initiated continental and marine deposition, creating mineral resources. Among them, coal and limestone occur in an east-west direction in Meghalaya’s south, and the coal has a high sulphur content.

This is because, unlike most of the coal in India, which is deposited in the large basins of the Permo-Carboniferous age (299 to 359 million years ago), Meghalayan coal was formed in lagoons much later (50 to 33 million years ago). As a result, the coal seams are lensoidal: thick in the middle but pinching out laterally, and with a scattered distribution. And because of these reasons, it is not possible to use the same mining plan that engineers use to mine coal in other parts of the country. In other words, and professionally speaking, Meghalayan coal is not a mineable asset.

In my earlier visit to region, and long before the National Green Tribunal banned coal-mining in the region, I remember having seen several mine pits close to each other. I was told that these pits used to be sites of rat hole mining and had since been abandoned.

The state’s coal seam occurs at a depth of nearly 150 meters, so a vertical pit must be dug made to reach it. The miners who extract the coal must climb down 500 feet into the mine. Then, at that level, they are forced to crawl for about 150 meters horizontally. In these situations, they risk coming upon another abandoned, and collapsible, mine or an abandoned mine that has since become an underground reservoir of water. When they encounter the latter, the result is a flash flood.

Meghalaya has an estimated 559 million tonnes of coal reserves and all its coal mines are all privately owned. They are not governed by any environmental protection laws, and many abandoned mines are left unworked, and aren’t filled up once all the coal has been extracted. These gaping pits and rat holes provide easy routes for the water to flow through. Consequently, surface runoffs have considerably reduced in volume: the expanding network of underground channels of human creation are now draining the rivers. This in turn explains why there is an acute shortage of potable water on the surface.

Several scientific reports have also warned that Meghalaya’s water bodies are also suffering the effects of acidic mine drainage from the sulphur-rich coal mines. Several civil rights activists have voiced their concerns about the worsening environmental conditions in Meghalaya. The coal- and other mining activities, which already wreak havoc in the social and cultural lives of the region’s peoples, also posing grave threats to a natural environment that took millions of years to evolve.

It is high time that such activities are stopped immediately. And for this to happen, the people of Meghalaya have to come together and raise their concerns in one voice. Let us regain the paradise.

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Being committed to the ideal of pluralism of the Indian society, the framers of the Indian Constitution of India were conscious of the need for the protection of the rights and privileges of the minority communities. Accordingly, the Constitution of India under Article 30 provides for the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. According to Clause (1) of Article 30, “All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” In Clause (2) of the same Article it is provided, “The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.”

In spite of the existence of the above provisions, nowhere in the Constitution was the term “minority” defined. It was in 1992 that the term minority was defined officially by section 2(c) of The National Commission for Minority Act, 1992 (NCMA) wherein it is stated “Minority for the purposes of this Act, means a community notified as such by the Central Government;”. To give effect to the above provision of the NCMA and in exercise in exercise of the powers conferred by it the Central Government notified Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Zoroastrians (Parsis) as “the Minority communities” for the purposes of the said Act vide notification SO No. 818 (E), F.No. l/ 11 /93-MC (1)) dated 23.10.1993,

In early 2005, the Indian Parliament enacted the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 (NCMEI Act) which provides for the establishment of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI). One of the functions of the NCMEI, according to section 11(f) of the NCMEI Act, is to “decide all questions relating to the status of any institution as a Minority Educational Institution and declare its status as such;” However, while determining the status of any institutions as a Minority Educational Institution, the Commission is guided by Section 2(g) of the NCMEI Act as it defines a Minority Educational Institution. Section 2(g) states “Minority Educational Institution means a college or institution (other than a University) established or maintained by a person or group of persons from amongst the minorities”

Para 3 of the Guidelines for determination of Minority Status, Recognition, Affiliation and related matters in respect of Minority Educational Institutions under the Constitution of India states, “It has been held by the Eleven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 that a minority, whether linguistic or religious, is determinable only by reference to demography of the State and not by taking into consideration the population of the country as a whole. The application of numerical test with reference to religion in states like Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and Nagaland makes Sikhism, Islam and Christianity, the majority religions in those states respectively.” When Christianity is a majority religion in Nagaland, the same is the case with Meghalaya. The percentage of Christian population since 1981 has always been more than 50 percent of the total population of the State of Meghalaya and it shows an increasing trend with each census. The population increased from 52.62 percent in 1981 to 70.25 percent in 2001 and 74.59 percent in 2011 census. On the basis of the notification of the Central Government dated 23.10.1993 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002), we can deduce that Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhist and Zoroastrians (Parsis) who constitute 4.40 percent, 0.10 percent, 0.33 percent and 0.02 percent of the total population of the state remain as minority communities of Meghalaya.

Since Christianity is a majority religion in Meghalaya and that to determine the minority status of educational institution, state population is used as a unit for consideration, by no stretch of imagination the Christian run educational institutions can be given the status of Minority Educational Institutions (MEI). Interestingly, the Christian run educational institutions has consistently claim and recognised by the State Government as minority as MEI even post Supreme Court ruling in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002). However, a contradiction has emerged in the State in so far as the Government aided Christian run institutions are concerned. While on the one hand they are recognised by the State Government as MEI, yet on the other the State imposes its job reservation policy on such institutions which goes against the right of MEI. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Case of P.A. Inamdar Vs. State of Maharashtra [2006 (6) SCC 537] that the policy of reservation in admission and employment cannot be cannot be made applicable to a minority institution.

When this author filed application for information under RTI Act, 2005 to Directorate of Higher and Technical Education of Meghalaya to provide the list/names of colleges in Meghalaya that have been notified by the appropriate authority as minority institutions the same application was forwarded to the Principals/PIO of all deficit colleges with a request to provide the information directly to the applicant. While replying to the RTI application forwarded to them, some Principals of Christian run institutions chose to remain silent or reply that no such list/names of colleges has been notified to be minority and others claim to be minority institutions but produce irrelevant certification. However, later I managed to unofficially receive a copy of the certificate obtained by St. Edmunds’ College which is one of the oldest and premier Colleges run by an organisation belonging to majority Christian community from the NCMEI dated June 7, 2007. It may be reminded that the Principal of St. Edmund’s College, Shillong chose to ignore my request for information on minority issue contained in the RTI application mentioned above. As per this certificate, St. Edmund’s College managed to obtain certification of being MEI within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the NCMEI Act, 2004 “ON THE BASIS OF THE CONCESSION MADE BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT….” Besides, St. Edmunds’ College there could be other Christian run educational institutions in the state who could have obtained such certificate from NCMEI on the same basis.

But many questions remain to be answered. First, whether Christian run institutions in Meghalaya such as St. Edmunds’ managed to obtain certification on the basis of facts that they are minority institutions fulfilling the guidelines made by the NCMEI or simply on the basis of concession made by the State Government? Second, under what provision of law can the State Government make concession for recognition of Christian run institution(s) in contravention to Supreme Court ruling in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) OR whether such concession is not at all in violation of the Supreme Court ruling? Third, whether the Supreme Court ruling in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) is not valid any longer at the time of concession made the State Government recognising institutions run by members of Christian majority community as MEI? Fourth, whether NCMEI is bound by the concession of the State Government even if it goes against law? Fifth, why the Christian run institutions do not challenge the State Government’s imposition of job reservation policy if they were recognised as MEI on the basis of legal facts? Sixth, has the State Government lost its autonomy but become subservient to parochial forces having financial, numerical and electoral clout? Seventh, why those institutions claiming to be MEI were interested to hide the relevant certificate when the RTI was filed?

The above questions require further investigation, research and legal testing in the court of law to establish the factual position of Christian run educational institutions in Meghalaya.

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Colonial politics of labelling communities have had disastrous consequences which continue to impact the lives of the colonized. Identities were created and circulated through this act which in turn had categorised, included and excluded the communities living in the colonial fringe. Karbis were labelled ‘heathen’, ‘worshippers of malignant demons’, ‘unwarlike’, ‘timid’, ‘coward’ ‘bloodthirsty’ and such other colonial vocabularies which continue to haunt them. Colonial authorities persisted with the misnomer, ‘Mikir’, over the ancient indigenous nomenclature Karbi and the label remained in force for centuries. Colonial categorisation of Karbis into Hills and Plains simply because of geographical locations continues to divide and distance the tribe psychologically, socially, culturally and politically. The colonizers however saw in the Karbis their ‘industriousness’ as it served the colonial enterprise.

Living with Labels 

Colonial labelling is ‘a political act since labels include and exclude.’ 1Retzlaff, Steffi, 2005 – What’s in a Name? The Politics of Labelling and Native Identity Construction, The Canadian Journal of Native Studies XXV, 2(2005); pp. 609-626 The colonial administrators and ethnographers preferred the misnomer Mikir over Karbi, the indigenous nomenclature, goaded by local assamese intellectuals like Gunabhiram Barua.2 Barua, Gunaviram, 1857 (reprint) – Aham Buranji, Publication Board of Assam. Karbis have been singled out for being ‘unambitious’, ‘cowardly’ and ‘wanting in martial spirits’ 3Stewart, R Leut., 1855 – Notes on Northern Cachar, J.A.S.B. Vol. XXIV and taken advantage of for being ‘unwarlike’ and ‘peaceful’. Sir Charles James Lyall and Edward Stackk, the first ethnographers to write on the Karbis, also called them ‘mild and unwarlike’ who asserted that the ‘Mikir have never been a warlike race…’ 4Sir Charles James Lyall and Edward Stack, The Mikirs 1908; 5, 22The American Baptist Missionaries described the Karbis as ‘demon worshippers’ 5Moore, PH Mrs, 1901 –Twenty Years in Assam; Baptist Mission Press and labelled them as ‘savage and bloodthirsty’ 6Montgomery, HB, 1919- Following the Sunrise – A Century of Baptist Missions 1813-1913, published in connection with the Centennial of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society by the American Baptist Publication Society, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis. The ‘distinction’ of ‘Hill Meekirs and the Plain Meekirs’7Stewart, R Leut., 1855 – Notes on Northern Cachar, A.S.B. Vol. XXIVthough historically belonging to the same ethnic group was insisted upon and dividing them under these invented categories in the colonial constitution making exercise through Government of India Act, 1935. 8Syiemlieh, Davi R, 2014 – On the Edge of Empire – Four British Plans for North East India 1941-1947, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd.

The psychological, cultural and political divide between the ‘Hill and Plain’ Karbis still continue who are paying the price of colonial politics of labelling. The myth has persisted and disadvantaged the Karbis in more ways as Independent India has retained the similar framework with active conspiracy of the State of Assam.

We will critically analyse the impact of colonial labelling of Karbis to question the modern myth of how ‘backwardness’ is measured in terms of ‘laziness’, ‘peacefulness’ with ‘timidity’, ‘unwarlike’ with ‘racial inferiority’ and how these invented categories have traumatized them.

Industrious Karbis 

No colonial sources have ever described Karbis as ‘lazy’. Rather, in various available documents, Karbis have always been hailed as ‘industrious’. American Baptist missionaries too likewise have praised the Karbi trait of being ‘particularly quiet and industrious.’

Rev. J Rae of Serampore Mission, the first European to have ever visited the Mikir areas in April 1836, ten years after the infamous Yandabu Treaty, had given a fair detail of the tribe existing then in his appeal to Capt. Jenkins in these words:

The Mikirs never cultivate the valleys between the hills. On my asking why they did not do so, their answer was, that they had no cattle, and where were they, being such poor people to get them? Yet their appearance did not indicate poverty, for, as I passed along, I saw their women and children covered with silver bangles and ear-rings etc. Some had brass, mixed with silver; and every village seemed to have an abundance of fowls, pigs, and sometimes goats. The dhan was quite abundant, and was stored in houses: the coolies that came with me from Kazi Runga to the first Mikir village, told me, that the Mikirs sometimes supplied the people of the plains with dhan when it was scarce there. This must be owing to the more industrious habits of the Mikirs, who are able to get a sufficiency for their own wants, and even to spare to others, from their scanty and hard soil. The Mikirs are very different from their lazy apathetic neighbours, the Assamese in the plains; when it is also considered what the former people use only a small hoe for cultivation, we must certainly speak well of their industry.9Calcutta Christian Observer, April 1836

The colonial authority was meticulous in its observation of the various tribal communities and their cultural and physical traits. William Robinson in his accounts of the Karbis of 1841 had described:

‘That division of the Nowgong district known as the Mikir hills, occupies a tract of hilly country covering an area of 1710 square miles. These hills are occupied by a fine athletic and industrious race of people, called Mikir.’ 10Robinson, William, 1841 – A Descriptive Account of Assam: With a Local Sketch of Geography; Ostell and Lepage, British Library, Bishop’s College Press, Calcutta

Robinson, further taking note from J Rae’s observation of 1836, also had reiterated the fact that Karbis were ‘industrious’:

‘The occupation of the Mikir consists chiefly of agriculture, in which cotton forms a principal article; rice is also very generally cultivated. These articles are usually grown on the slopes of the hills, the Mikirs seldom availing themselves of the valleys. They have notwithstanding an abundance of grain, and in times of scarcity, occasionally have the means of supplying the people of the plains. This must chiefly be attributed to the more industrious habits of the Mikirs, who from their hard and scanty soil, are able to procure a sufficiency to meet their own wants, and even to spare a portion of their hard earnings to others.’

Lieut. R Stewart in his report summed up in the ‘Notes on Northern Cachar’ (1855) labelled the Karbis as ‘unambitious’ and remarked that:

‘The single exception to the prevalence of warlike feelings and habits in these hills is afforded by the Meekirs, and industrious but unambitious people in North Cachar. Though they carry spear and dhao, they use them only for the purposes of cultivation and wood-cutting. Literally, they have beaten their swords to ploughshares. The result is that they are the constant prey of the Angamee Nagas, and other tribes, whose trade is war, and whose chief joys are those of the fight. The Meekirs must be classed with the Bayeiye and the Banuyeti of Africa; they are the Quakers of the Indian hills, as the latter are of the African plains.’ 11The North British Review, Volume 38, 1863; 402

Dismissing the traditional values and institutions of the Meekirs, Stewart also commented that

‘The Meekirs appear to have no government; nor can it be imagined for what purpose a people could require government who have abandoned the idea of defending themselves or their property.’

Stewart had also labelled all the tribes of the region as ‘savage tribes’ or ‘naked savages’ that invariably included the ‘Meekirs.’ In fact, the label ‘savage’ finds regular mentions in almost all the colonial and missionary accounts that described the hill tribes of the North East.

Horatio Bickerstaff Rowney repeated with the same dismissive colonial attitude and labelled the Karbis as ‘not warriors’ and ‘cowardly’ but found them ‘laborious’ by observing that

‘the Hill Meekirs are not warriors. But if cowardly, they have the credit of being very laborious, and raise rice and cotton in abundance, the latter of which they sell to advantage. The only weapon they carry is the dao, of which no use is made except for cultivation and wood cutting. Their dress consists of two pieces of cotton cloth dyed with red stripes and sewn together like a bag, with aperture left for the head and arms; and this is put on in a manner of a shirt.’ 12Rowney, Horatio Bickerstaff, 1882 – The Wild Tribes of India, Thos De La Rue & Co

WW Hunter in his account of 1881 maintained the Karbis as being ‘universally described as the most pacific and industrious of all the hills tribes of Assam…’ who cultivated cotton in large areas or 3846 acres (9602 Bighas) according to the Revenue Survey of 1872. He went on to assert that ‘They are a fine, athletic, but poor in spirit, and somewhat devoid of personal courage…’ In the same account, Hunter reiterated that ‘As a rule they are a laborious people…’ 13Hunter, WW, 1886 –Imperial Gazetteer of India (Vol.X), 2^nd edition, Trubner & Co., London

Hunter’s observations give some important insights into the changing socio-economic dynamics among the Karbis. He noted:

‘Each little hamlet manages its own affairs. In their own hills, the Mikirs cultivate cotton and summer rice, according to the nomadic system of agriculture known as jum, in forest clearings made mostly on the slopes of the hills. Their implement is the hoe; cattle are not kept, and milk is regarded as impure. In the plains, however, they are giving up this prejudice and learning to cultivate winter rice with plough.’

From simple hoe to plough, from hill slopes to wet cultivation in the plains, the transition is remarkable. This transition must have made a tremendous impact on the economic life of the Karbis. This change in the mode of production during the early colonial days was indeed a remarkable phase in Karbi history.

GD Walker, the author of the first Karbi dictionary, ‘A Dictionary of the Mikir Language’ (1952) had in his preface to the book offered a theory of why the tribe is ‘unwarlike’. According to him, the language had been ‘practically one and the same throughout’ which was then spread over a ‘wide area from Golaghat to Kamrup and the Khasi Hills beyond Gauhati, and from the Cachar plains near Silchar to the forests north of Bishnath in Darrang’ because of the ‘unwarlike character of the Mikir people.’

Maj John Butler who had toured the Karbi territory as a military officer described that ‘…the Meekirs seem devoid of anything approaching to a martial spirit…’ but praised them for their quality of being ‘…a quiet industrious race of cultivators…’ 14Bulter, Maj. John, 1855 –Travels and Adventures in the Province of Assam; Smith, Elder & Co., 65, Cornhill

From 1826 onwards, the British started imposing its administrative system in the newly acquired territories and had deputed special officers in each area to understand the various tribal people, their social, cultural, religious and even physical traits. The ‘first European who ever penetrated into that country’ Rev. J Rae of the Serampore Mission stationed at ‘Gowahatti’ wrote ‘an appeal’ in February 1836 to Capt. Jenkins urging him ‘to endeavour at the same time to show the feasibility of doing something for their moral and religious instruction…’ wherein a fair account of the economic life of those inhabiting in the Karbi areas of ‘Noagong’ was given. The American Baptist Missionaries also similarly described the Karbis as ‘particularly quiet and industrious’  in a ‘Report of the American Baptist Mission to Assam, 1845’. The Karbis were also described as ‘shy and timid with strangers and usually bolt into the jungle on seeing a European’ as Waddell had observed. He further noted that ‘In the vicinity of the Hinduised Assamese the Mikirs are rapidly however giving up their primitive habits…’ 15Waddell, LA, 1901 & 2000 –The Tribes of the Brahmaputra Valley – A Contribution to their Physical Types and Affinities’, Logos Press, New Delhi

A fairly elaborate account of the Karbis in the ‘Notes on Northern Cachar’ repeats the same observation:

‘The Meekirs though cowardly are laborious and persevering, and are considered the best subjects in N. Cachar, keeping clear of courts, paying revenue regularly, and working hard at their vocation as cultivators. They rear rice and cotton in abundance, disposing of the latter to Cossiahs and to merchants who come up the Dyung. When not employed in agriculture they fell large trees, construct canoes, and float them down to market in Assam, realizing considerable profit by this manufacture. The labour of their cultivation is greater than that of the other tribes, as bamboo jungle is scarce in their locality, and they are necessitated to clear forest land.’16Asiatic Society of Bengal, Edited by the Secretaries, Vol. XXIV, Nos. I to VII, 1855, Calcutta and Printed by J. Thomas, Baptist Mission Press, 1856 

Colonial Revenue System and the ‘laborious’ Karbis 

After 1826, the colonial authorities gradually took over the tribal territories and the Karbi inhabited areas scattered over a large areas of NC Hills, Jaintia and Khasi Hills and in Nowgong and Sibsagar districts too came under the British revenue system:

‘Soon after the British annexed the Ahom territory on February 24, 1826, the Karbi territories, which were under the domain of the Ahoms, automatically became a part of the British territory. The Karbis of the adjacent Janitia hills came under the British in March 1835 when the Jaintia kingdom was annexed by the British. The North Cachar Hills, part of the Karbi territory, was free from British India up to 1854. Finally, Lord Dalhousie accorded his approval to the annexation of North Cachar Hills on the ground that the ‘occupation of the territory was a less objectionable alternative than letting it alone.’ Accordingly, in early 1854, the British annexed North Cachar Hills. Thus, by 1954 the whole of Karbi land came under British domain.’ 17Subba, TB & Ghosh, GC [ed.], 2003 –The Anthropology of North-East India; Orient Longman

The colonial authority was swift in imposing its own revenue system in these territories, and by 1838, brought the Karbis under the first revenue settlement:

‘…it was determined to bring them under a revenue settlement of some kind, and to raise them, if possible, in the social scale by putting them on the same fiscal platform as the Assamese of the plains. The Assamese had always looked upon the Mikirs with contempt and dislike, and the tribe had kept itself aloof in the jungles, away from all civilizing intercourse. The hills were now visited by a British officer and a settlement affected with the consent of the Chiefs, by which the old tributes were converted into an assessment upon each house according to the number of the male cultivators living therein. The total net revenue so assessed was about Rs. 1700.’ 18Mackenzie, Alexander, 1884 & 2012 – ‘History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal’; Cambridge University Press; (1884 & Digitally printed version, 2012)

W W Hunter mentioned that:

‘When the country was first brought under British rule, a small tribute in kind was exacted from the Mikirs; but in 1837-38, this system of taxation was abolished, and the tribe was formed into three imaginary grades or classes, and a house tax was levied of varying amount on each of these classes. On the first class a house rate of Rs. 4 or 8s. per annum was assessed; on the second class a tax of Rs. 3 or 6s; and on the third class a tax of Rs. 1.8 or 3s. This settlement yielded a net revenue of Rs. 1711.8.0 or 3s in 1837-38.’ 

This system did not work well for the British and two years later, a uniform house-tax was levied on the Karbis at the rate of Rs. 2.4 abolishing the three imaginary classes irrespective of the number of families sharing the same house. The British found out that, in order to avoid the house-taxes, ‘many families herd together in the same house.’ (Hunter, 1879; 189) The problem of British revenue collection was made harder by the fact that the Karbis changed their habitations ‘every two or three years’ looking for ‘fresh lands for cultivation.’ Hunter described that the Karbi houses were ‘clean and healthy in appearance, and very picturesque.’ He also mentioned about the Karbis engaging in trades ‘carried on with the people of the plains’ through ‘bartering in cotton, aria thread, caoutchouc, and bees-wax for salt and piece-goods’

Rev. Rae in 1836 had already mentioned of such barter trades the Karbis engaged in with their new liking for ‘hukkah and cloth etc.’ Rev. Rae had described that the Karbis were ‘extensive cultivator of cotton, which is their principal commodity for export. How much is cultivated, I am unable to say, but it must be to a great extent; indeed, were it not for the Nagas, Mikirs, and Lalongs, the people of Asam would fare but poorly in cotton…Their common practice is to exchange their cotton for salt…’  Rae had mentioned about ‘hats’ (markets) being established in the vicinity to conduct barter trades with the tribal people. These ‘hats’ (Karbi = hithi) played multiple functions in the lives of the hill people besides serving the mercantile interests.

Lyall and Stack in ‘The Mikirs’ had described the ‘institution of cooperative agriculture by the village lads, the bachelors’ house or terang’  or the ‘association or club of the dekas’ being the ‘most important institution from the point of view of agriculture…useful form of cooperation’ which was then ‘falling into disuse.’  The Karbi economic life was a cycle of ‘raising in ordinary years sufficient food for their subsistence, and a considerable amount of cotton and lac for export to the plains’.

Trade with Plainsmen and the Opium Havoc 

However, the growing trade relations with the plainsmen were also beginning to have other adverse effects on the Karbis. A Missionary wife Mrs. PH Moore had remembered

‘One sad result of the Mikirs coming to the plains is that they are fast learning to take opium…’19 Moore, Mrs. PH (ed.), 1901 – Twenty Years in Assam, Omsons Publications, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi.

Wild tea plants were already discovered in Assam in 1823 and crossbreeding of Assam tea with smuggled Chinese tea plants was started by 1834. By 1839, Assam tea began to be transported to England with the intention ‘to compete on the open market with Chinese tea, with the hope of eventually eliminating Britain’s reliance on China.’ Opium poppy also ‘grew abundantly in Assam’20Saikia, Yasmin, 2005 – Assam and India – Fragmented Memories, Cultural Identity, and the Tai-Ahom Struggle; Permanent Black, Delhi and the colonial masters began to exploit this to their commercial advantage. The opium cultivation began by 1847-1848 and introduced opium as cash crops and started the sale of manufactured opium in the market. By 1860, opium trade became a government monopoly criminalising non-licensed cultivation of opium. Licenses were sold to ‘respectable persons’ who offered the highest bid. There appeared 5137 opium shops in 1873-74 period surpassing the number of villages in Assam. Opium revenue increased in leaps and bounds from 1875 to 1879. Colonial government defended its policy by claiming that opium was required by the people ‘in order to protect themselves from the diseases that are prevalent in a very damp and malarial climate like Assam…’ As a result, the consumption of opium far surpassed the Indian average and much in higher quantity that was set by the League of Nations and Assam was declared a ‘Black Spot’ where consumption was highest during 1920-1921. And ‘the largest consumers’ were ‘the Mikir tribe, of whom, 80 to 85 per cent’ in a population of 1, 18, 629 ate opium according to the Final Report of the ‘Royal Commission on Opium’.

The colonial government actively promoted opium sale and Karbis were defenceless against this assault which ruined them permanently. JH Hutton, Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills, wrote in his Naga tour diaries dated 31 August 1920, which gives a crucial insight into how opium was forced upon the ‘wretched Mikirs’ –

‘Disposed of the opium shop which I have settled with one Gupteswar who seems less likely than the other applicants to put the shop to illicit purposes. He will be rationed at present with 30 seers of opium monthly. There are some very high offers for this shop as compared with the bids made in Kohima when it was sold by auction. I suspect that the reason is partly that it was the only unrationed shop on the Railway in the neighbourhood and therefore of value for smuggling purposes as I understand a good deal of opium is smuggled into Burma via the Assam-Bengal Railway and Chittagong. Partly, however, the competition for the shop was in order to exploit the wretched Mikirs for cane and lac and agar, the last of which has now a tremendously enhanced value. Under the present system the opium shops are simply used as a handle to induce the Mikirs to bring in jungle produce, for which I fancy they are paid in opium instead of cash, and it is well known that the Marwari trader who wants to make a fortune in cane, cotton, agar or lac must control the opium shop either directly or Benami, and it is obviously to his interest to encourage opium eating, and that much more so than the man who merely sells it for the profit on the opium, since he stands to make a huge profit in so many ways of each opium eating Mikir.’ 

It was the time when opium contributed ‘more than one-fifth of the government revenue in the vast empire in British India’ and the ‘wretched Mikirs’ were easy victims. During the period, Hutton and other colonial sources described, the Karbis were as not yet used to wet cultivation. They were dependent on bartering petty forest items with traders in the plains and the best they did were engaging in large-scale cotton cultivation. It may be assumed that the majority of the people depended on shifting cultivation in the ‘slopes’ using only the ‘hoes’ and producing only what were needed for sustenance. No surplus was produced or it was not even possible to do so in such a mode of economic activity. Paddy cultivation in the plains came very gradually and in a haphazard manner. Opium habit introduced by the British soon consumed almost the entire Karbi population. The ‘industrious’ Karbis bartered away household items, domestic animals, ornaments etc. to pay for the deadly habit and within a short period of ten to twenty years after 1826, they were pushed to abject poverty. The subsistence economy was thus completely ruined, so was the ‘industriousness’. The new British revenue and land policies wrecked the old social, cultural, and economic traditions by creating a new class of middlemen who collected revenues as mouzadars and rapidly rose in prestige and power, even overshadowing the traditional chiefs.

The Politics of Labelling 

There is a general idea that Karbis are ‘lazy’ and this trait is attributed for their ‘backwardness’. Many have succumbed to this theory and blame their own tribesmen for the economic mess that they are in today. The celebrated Malay author Prof. Syed Hussein Alatas in his book ‘The Myth of the Lazy Native’ has attempted to debunk the myth essentially as a colonial creation and thus called it a ‘colonial ideology’. Alatas argued that

‘…ideology of colonial capitalism evaluated people according to their utility in their production system and the profit level’ under Western rule, with the result that the capabilities of the indigenous inhabitants were denigrated through various myths and stereotypes, notably, the myth of the lazy native.’ 

The colonial ideology of being ‘superior’ was used to justify how the colonized people were classed and categorised that played a crucial role in constructing new and potentially negative identities for them. Labelling Karbis as ‘unwarlike’, ‘timid’ or ‘devoid of anything approaching martial’ had remained in popular discourse beyond colonial time, shaping the way the Karbis imagined of themselves with all negative impacts. In Hunter’s own admission, the ‘Mikirs were found very useful as coolies in the Lushai Expedition of 1871-72’.  Karbi coolies who were forced to fight the British war of conquest against the Lushai that fitted the colonial design and were praised – ‘Hitherto they have borne a bad name for cowardice, but their character in this respect was cleared by their conduct at the time of the Lushai expedition.’

Colonial Coolie Corps, composed of various hill tribes including Goorkha, Kookies, Cosseyahs, Cacharies, Nagas and Mekirs, were employed to carry out the most dangerous missions such as reconnaissance, cutting jungles, building huts, who faced deadly cholera epidemic without much or no supply of medicine and often left unguarded by sepoys.21Woodthorpe, RG, 1873 –The Lushai Expedition 1871-72; Hurst and Blackett, London But colonial dependence on various tribal communities, including the Karbis, for manpower in its army was never acknowledged in public discourse. Mackenzie mentioned:

“Our own population of Mikirs being very scanty, we shall be unable to continue to employ them in conducting expeditions into the Angami Naga Hills, for rather than submit to this service, I am persuaded they will leave the district, or be utterly ruined from not being able to do their cultivation.” 

After the failure of ‘absolute conquest,’ the British attempted to recruit Nagas as soldiers. This was one of the strategies adopted for pacifying the Nagas, but it failed as the Nagas would abandon the service in a short time. So the British army was mostly made up of the Manipuris, Kukis, Kacharis, Mikiris and Assamese. Latter, Nepali immigrants were brought in to serve as well.’

Colonial era Karbis were praised for being ‘industrious’ but in spite of this, they were also categorised as ‘backward’. In one of his secret cables to the British parliament, Governor Reid had confessed that the Karbis ‘…pay proportionately more in taxes and receive less in amenities than any other area in the Province…’ and even ‘proposed’ that ‘neglect of this kind would be remedied’, which however was never done. The ‘laborious’ Karbis were subjected to maximum taxation in the new colonial revenue system and in the ‘Jaintia Hills territory, which is wholly British, a house-tax at the rate of Rs.1 per house is levied, the Mikir and Kuki settlements paying double this rate.’

The British administration, for good reasons, is also blamed for dividing the ‘backward’ hills from the prosperous plains and perpetuating the binary for political and economic control over both. Irrespective of the multiplicity of hill people and their cultures, the British labelled them equally as ‘backward’. Against this sweeping generalisation, JJP Wouters has argued that;

‘…hill dwellers came to be seen as the opposite of ‘British civilisation’, as well as inferior to the alternative civilisation presented by the high castes of the ‘mainland’. This eventually led to the ‘invention of tribes’, a process through which uplanders became socially construed as collectively backward and sharing characteristics that were fundamentally different from those inhabiting the plains.’

Backwardness is therefore constructed in terms of ‘British civilisation’ and this colonial construction has remained in circulation influencing even the policy makers in modern India. Being ‘industrious’ alone counts less or even nothing in the post-colonial ideology too in the same manner as the qualities of being ‘peaceful’ and ‘unwarlike’ are condemned as distinct racial ‘inferiority’. In the colonial greed for power and profit, opium trade was aggressively promoted, destroying the Karbi trait of being ‘industrious’ and condemning them to perpetual backwardness. The truth is:

‘Negative labels (and implications) can disempower groups through the creation of potent negative stereotypes and can thus be a powerful means of exercising social control and a tool to manipulate identities.’ 22Retzlaff, Steffi, 2005 – What’s in a Name? The Politics of Labelling and Native Identity Construction, The Canadian Journal of Native Studies XXV, 2(2005); pp. 609-626

Decolonizing Colonial Construct 

The impact of British colonialism is a rarely discussed issue among Karbis. The Historical Trauma (HT) inflicted on Karbis is therefore not realized. Traditional Karbi territories were dissected multiple times at the whims of the colonial state. As a result, the ‘Hills’ and ‘Plains’ categories of Karbis were constructed, categorised and forced to remain isolated from each other for centuries and the political, cultural and linguistic impacts are still being felt. The ‘industrious’ Karbis were forced to wholesale opium addiction which totally crushed their economic backbone forever. The middlemen, such as mauzadars and opium lessees, created in colonial economic and political interest introduced a new social class which asserted its illegitimate authority over entire Karbis. Missionaries who accompanied the colonial administrators introduced modern education among Karbis, but even they too were not free from colonial attitude. Missionaries cannot absolve themselves from negatively portraying the Karbi ideas of the ‘self’ by attacking their religious and cultural foundations as ‘unmeaning’.

The territorial, economic and cultural disruptions caused by colonialism continue to impact Karbi life in many negative ways. Many of the crucial issues facing present generation Karbis are rooted in colonialism and it is therefore important to understand them in the larger framework of ‘Historical Trauma’ and begin the process of decolonization. In other word, this process for Karbis may perhaps begin with such an effort of deconstructing colonial policies and practices in the light of critical scrutiny.

___________________________

Dharamsing Teron is an indigenous activist hailing from the Karbi people in Assam’s central hilly region of Karbi Anglong. He has been in the forefront of a long-drawn autonomy struggle since 1986 participating in the political, cultural and literary aspirations of the Karbi people. He has initiated documenting vanishing Karbi folklore and publishing books in English, which include the popular ‘Karbi Studies’ series in a collaborative effort with young Karbi researchers, writers and translators. He is currently the founder Director of ‘Centre for Karbi Studies’ which aims to foster indigenous research initiatives in the ‘most under-researched area’.

Linso Timungpi is an Assistant Professor of Geography. She is an executive member of Centre for Karbi Studies and has translated Karbi fiction into English.

The post How to Describe Karbis? appeared first on RAIOT.

Naduh ba ki Nongdie jingdie ha madan bad rud lynti jong ka Nongbah Shillong ki la iawanlang bad iamir jingmut lang kawei hapoh ka Seng Meghalaya &Greater Shillong Progressive Hawkers and Street Vendors Association na ka bynta ban iakhun ia ka hok kamai jakpoh, ki la mih shibun ki jingkren bein, ki jingisih bad hateng hateng ki jingbyrngem-byrthen pyrshah ia ki nongdie madan na ki briew bapher bapher.

Ia kane ka jingshun-jingisih lah ban bynta ha ki ar bynta:

Da ki riewshit khlieh kiba isih bad shun iap ia kiwei khlem nongrim
2. Da ki heh ki hain, ki heh saipan bad ki “riewdonburom”

Kita kiba shun ne isih ia ki Nongdie madan, namar ba don napdeng ki nongdie madan kiba dei na kiwei pat ki jaid ki kynja, bad kane ka jait jingshun ne jingisih ka mih na ka jingtieng bad ka jingsheptieng iohba kine ki bar ri ne bar jylla kin sa tuh ne knieh lut ia ka jingdon jingem jong ki trai ri ne ia ka jinglong trai bad ki trai ri kin sa long mraw. Ka long kumjuh hi ia ki trai ri nangne kiba mad ia ka jingshah isih ne jingshah shun haba ki mih na la ka jong ka bri ban leit kamai ne shong skul sha kiwei pat ki jaka bad ki trai ri nangne ki im hapdeng ka jingsyier shabar na la ka jong ka iing ne ka shnong. Balei ka long kumne? Ka daw ka long ba ka jingshun ne jingisih hi kam ju lah ban pynbha ne kyntiew. Ka pynpait bad pynjot ha ka kyrteng jong ka jingtieng.

Niuma, kine ki riewshit khlieh ki dei hi ki briew kiba iakhun-iaksaid man la ka sngi ban pyndap ia ka jingim, ki iaksaid ruh kumno ban ia imlang-sahlang bad kiwei, ki dei ruh kiba wad ne donkam ia ka jingieid ne ban ia ioh paralok kumba long lem kiwei bad ha kajuh ka por da kaba ki leh kumne ban isih ne shun ia kiwei ka ai ha ki ia ka jinghun mynsiem bad ki sngew kumba ki la leh ei ei ha ka jingim.

Nangta shuh shuh kine ki riewshit khlieh ne ki riewshun briew kim dei kiba isih ne shun briew lynter ne man ka por. Ha ka jingshisha ki long kum ki myrsiang kiba rkhie haba ki paralok ki iarkhie, ki beh thong iano re iano haba ki paralok ki kthong briew bad ki kynran dien pat haba ki sngewthuh ba ka jingim jong ki ka don ha ka jingma. Kumta ki leh ia kiei kiei namar ba kiwei ruh ki leh. Ka long kaei kaei kaba sngewsih ba na kawei ka pateng sha kawei pat la thep la bsuh bad pynlong doh long snam ba dei ban shu mynjur matlah ia kaei kaba ong da kiba bun paid bad kane ka la tuh noh ia ka jinglaitluid jong ki briew ba ki lah ban jied hi ia kaei kaba ki kwah ban leh ha ka jingim bad ban shim ki rai kiba dei bad da ka jingtip bad jingshemphang, khlem da don mano manor uh kiba pynbor ne pynngeit ia ki.

Ha shuwa ba i mei in ioh lum da ki million ki pisa kutia kiba bsa pynim bad pynlong briew ia nga, I mei jong nga i dei i nongdie madan. Da ka jingkut jingmut kaba skhem ban pynheh pynsan bad pynlong briew ia nga, da ka jingngeit bad jingkyrmen kaba skhem i mei i phet shnong noh na Aizawl ban wan shong shnong bad kamai jakpoh ha Shillong.

Pule shaphang “ I mei jong nga i dei i nongdie madan” ha Raiot.

My Mother was a Hawker

Ym dei tang ba la pynheh pynsan ia kine ki riewshit khlieh ne nongshun briew ha ka lyer jong ka jingisih. Hynrei la pyndonkam bakla ruh ia ki kum ki atiar da kiwei pat ki riew donburom kiba ju pyndonkam ia ki riew shitkhlieh ban bein ban khoh ne ban leh ki kam jakhlia katba ialade pat ki riewdon burom ki kiar na ka tngit bad ka ahor jong ki riewmadan.

Phin lap ruh ba ka long ka jingshisha ba kine ki riew shitkhlieh kiba isih ne shun ia ki nongdie madan ki dei ma ki kiba nyngkong kiba ju mlien bha ban thied ki jain kup jain phong kiba stail bad laiphew rong ne ki mar ki matta na ki nongdie madan ha ka dor kaba bit bad ki rwai ki siaw ki kynud sur namar ba ki dang ioh ruh ban kynshew ka pisa sa na ka bynta ki jingbam ba sma iwbih na ki karai sdieh jong ki nongdie jingbam harud surok..

Nga sngewlem shisha na ka bynta jong phi ki riew shitkhlieh.

Kaba kham sngewtriem ka dei ka kynhun jong ki riewheh riewhain bad ki riew donburom kiba shong ha ki iing paki dulan , ha ki phyllaw ne kyrpong iing kiba pyngngad kiba ker tawiar da ki syntiew ki skud ha ryngkat ki ksew saphup , rongktieh bad thoh broin kiba shiphang shiphang ki talain tdong, ki kynthih ki wair i kum ba kin kynrup bad bam im kat ia ba don. Kine ki riewdon burom ki shong aram ha ki shuki bad miej dihsha bad la ka tawah kjat ki pyrsad myniem kum u ‘larhen bad ki biah phongrai ia ki nongdie madan.

Kine ki riewheh riew hain bad riew donburom ki mutdur samtawi ba ka pyrthei ka dei ka jong ki bad ki briew ki dei ban kynriah arliang surok , kumba kad ka duriaw basaw , haba ki iaid lynti ma ki.

Ki don tang kawei ban khnium bad tang kawei ban thnum ba kim lah shuh ban iaid laitluid bad ba ka jingitynnad ka la duh..

Ki pyrkhat ruh ba baroh ki briew ki dei ban thied ia ki jain kup jain phong bad ia kiwei de mar ki matta tang na ki dukan paki-dulan bad ha ka dor kaba tang ki Syiem ki Patsha ki kotbor. Em ym baroh ki don ka spah ban leh kumta, wat kito ki riew shitkhlieh ne ki rewshun briew, ym baroh na ki dei kiba don spah don tyngka ban thied ban pet tang na ki kaia kumba lah ma phi ki riew donburom.

Kiba bun bah ki nongbylla sngi bad ki nongtrei ki donkam ia ki nongdie madan kiba lah ban pynbiang ia ka kup ka sem bad ka bam ka dih ia ki khun ki kti jong ki ha ka dor kaba jem..

Ha ka aiom Krismas kiba bun bah ki briew khamtam kiba na ki shnong kiba jngai na ka Sor ki wan ban thied ban pet bad ki shem ia ka dor kaba jem na ki nongdie madan. Mano ki bym kwah ban thied ia ki jain ki nep ne ki mar ki mata ha ka dor kaba jem? Bad mano ki kmie ki kpa ki bym kmen ka mynsiem ban iohi ba ki khun kynthei ki khun shynrang baroh ki ioh mar shi jur ki juti bad shi kylliang ki spoti Krismas ha ki rong kiba pher bad phyrnai bad ruh ha ka dor kaba jem.

Wat sngew ei ei ma ngi ki rangli ki juki ngim lah bor ban thied ki mar ne ki jain kup jain phong kiba remdor na ki dukan paki dulan jong phi. Ngin ia phngian jied juti bad kynther ia ki sopti ba ki nongdie madan ki die harud lynti.

Kumta ki iakren shaphang ka jingitynnad ka Sor bad ka jingitynnad ha ki ka mut ba ki rangli ki juki, ki duk ki suk bad ki kup shilliang sem shilliang kim dei shuh ban don ha ki rud lynti ne ha ki iew ki hat bad ban pynthut ia ka jingim jong ki. Lehse ki mutdur ban ioh biang ia kito ki por jong ki sahep, ki dohlieh kiba ki dumok, kiba kren sih bad kiba tim ba tla ia ki mraw, bad ki klet noh pat ba ialade ruh ki la dei teng ki mraw..

Ki iakren shaphang ka jingiytnnad bad ha ki kam dei ka jingitynnad ba nylla jong ka mariang, hynrei ka dei ka jingdon ki dukan paki dulan, ki kali motor kiba heh bad rem dor, ki krem ki kroh ba la ring bor ding bad ki Cafe, ym ki dukan ja bad sha.

Ki nongthoh kotkhubor jong ka Nongbah ki shem ia ki nongialam bad nongkitkam jong ka Seng ki nongdie madan. Ki bor Sorkar ki la pyrshang ban kyndang ia ki nongdie madan Garo na Polo. Kumta ngi la ieng pyrshah ia kane ka jingleh donbor bad jingleh be ain. Ngi ki nongdie madan ngi dei ban long ka jingsarong jong ka Nongbah namar ym kum kiwei ki nongkhaii, ngi die ia ki mar ki matta kiba mih na la ka jong ka bri, ka kper kum ki soh ki pai, ki jhur ki jhep bad ki jingbam, khlem kano kano ka jingiarap ne jingkyrshan na ka Sorkar. Ka Seng ki nongdie madan ka sngewsarong ia ki dkhot jong ka kiba don ha Polo. Ngin iai khun bad ngin iai jop. 

Ki riew donburom ki dom ki bitar bad ki kren bein, kiei kine ki nongdie madan kiba sma syep sma iwtung kiba nud ban aireng bad ki bym pdiang ia ka roi ka par kumba kwah ma ki. Namarkata kim lah shah bad ki pyrshang da ki buit sha laki jong ki bad buit leh jubor jong ki ban pyntieng pynsmiej ia ki rangli ki juki bad kane ka dei ka jingleh kaba mynsaw kaba lah ban buh ia ka jingim jong ki briew bad kumjuh ia ka shong suk shong sain jong ka Nongbah Shillong ha ka jingma.

Hato ki tip mo bad ki don por ne don jingiatip lem ban tip ba ka jingdie jingdie ha madan bad rud lynti kam dei ka kam be ain? Bad ba ki Nongdie madan naduh ka snem 2016 ki la kyrpad bad dawa na ka Sorkar ban pyntreikam noh ia ka Ain jong ka Sorkar India kaba iadei bad ki Nongdie madan khnang ban lah ban weng ia ki jingeh baroh khamtam eh ia ka jingkhapngiah ka Sor bad ba ki Nongdie madan ruh kin ioh la ka hok, ka bhah ban kamai jakpoh katkum ka hok bad ka Ain ba ka Ri India ka ai ha ki.

Citizen’s guide to the laws about Hawkers & Vendors

Ki Nongdie madan ki la dawa bad kin iai dawa ban pyntreikam ia ka Ain jong ka Sorkar India na ka bynta ba kin ioh ban kamai jakpoh katkum ka hok bad ka nongkynti ba ka Riti Synshar ka Ri ka ai. Ha kajuh ka por kane ka Ain ba ki dawa kan weng ruh ia ki jingeh bad kan wanrah ym tang ia ka jingkylluid hynrei ia ka jingkhuid jingsuba , ka jingitynnad bad ka jingshngain ka Sor Shillong. Phewse ym don ba treh ban pynurlong ia kane namar ba kine ki nongdie madan kim iahap bad ka kyrdan jong ki kumta dei ban shu thom da ka bor bad weng jubor ia ki na sla kyndew. Kum kata ka jingthmu ka long ka bym lah ban pdiang bad ka Nongbah Shillong ka dei na ka bynta baroh, ym tang na ka bynta ki shi spah ngut ki heh ki hain ne ki riew don burom.  Ngin iai iakhun bad ngin jop.

The post KIBA SHUN BAD ISIH IA KI NONGDIEMADAN BAD BALEI? appeared first on RAIOT.

Ka Lamphrang Halor ka article 371 da ka RAIOT
Kumno ban synshar hi katkum ka tynrai ne thymmei sainpyrkhat bad ban iada bad kyntiew ia ka Jaidbynriew? Kane ka long ka jingkylli kaba ngi la iatai bad iakhih-iaksaid naduh ka snem 1924 ter ter haduh 1947 bad ruh hadien ba ka Ri India ka la ioh ka jinglaitluid, kane ka jingkylli ka iai buddien bad ka jingiakhih-iaksaid ka iai im. Hapdeng kine ki por la pynjari ia ka Sixth Schedule bad thaw ia  District Council ha ka snem 1952 bad bud sa ka Jylla ba pura (Meghalaya)ha ka snem 1972. Kine baroh ki jialong da ka jingthmu ban ailad ia ki Trai Ri ban san ban roi katkum ka thymmei sainpyrkhat  ne tynrai bad khamtam eh ban iada ia ka riti dustur, ka ktien, ka khyndew ka shyiap bad kiwei de ki bynta kiba iasnoh bad ka tynrai long jaidbynriew. Mynta ka jingkylli ka mih kano ka bynta ha ka Riti Synshar ka Ri India kaba lah ban ai ia ka bor ban synshar bad pyniaid laitluid katkum ka thymmei sainpyrkhat ne ka riti dustur bad ban iada ia ka Ri bad ka Jaidbynriew? Don kiba iakhun  ban ioh syndon da ka Jinglaitluid na ka Ri India? Kiwei pat ki dawa ban pynim biang ia ka Instrument of Accession? Hateng hateng ka sur ka sawa ruh ba dei  ban pynrung ia ka Ri Hynniewtrep hapoh ka Article 370 kumba long ka Jammu & Kashmir? Don ruh ka jingpyrta ban ioh la ka jong ka Jylla? Ka District Council lyngba ka bor ba la ai ha ka Sixth Schedule ka la treikam mynta la palat hynriew phew snem bad sawphew lai tylli ki snem ki la iaid naduh ba la ioh ia ka Jylla ba pura. Hapoh ka Sixth Schedule bad ka Jylla ba pura, haduh katno ngi lah ne ngi la lah ban synshar hi bad ban iada bad kyntiew ia ka Bri ne Jaidbynriew? bad nangne shano ngin iaid? Mynta kumne la don sa kawei pat ka jingdawa ban pynrung ne pynioh ia ka Jylla katkum ki kyndon jong ka Article 371 ka Riti Synshar ka Ri India.Ka jingiatai halor kane ka mat ka dang iaid bad ka raiot ka wanlam shaphi ia ki ar tylli ki jingthoh kiba iapher kawei na kawei pat halor ka Article 371.

Khnang ba ki paidbah kin sngewthuh shai kaei kata ka article 371 –  Ardent M. Basaiawmoit

Khnang ba ki paidbah kin sngewthuh shai, kaei kata ka article 371, ka HSPDP ka kwah ban pynmih ia ine I jingbatai lyngkot ia ka jingmut jong ka kumne harum:

1. Ka article kaba 371 ka dei ka kawei na ki khyrnit kaba kyrpang na ka bynta ki Jylla ha ka Ri India.
2. Kane ka khyrnit ka batai shai ba wat ka iing Dorbar Parliament jong ka Ri kan nym lah ban tuklar ia kino kino ki ain ba la thaw da ki Sorkar Jylla ha kaba ia dei bad ka Riti Dustur, ka Hok Longtrai ia ka Khyndew ka Shyiap, Ki Mar poh Khyndew bad ki Jingdon Jingem jong ki Jylla, Ka jingngeit bad Mane Blei, Ka Bishar ka Khaddar katkum ka tynrai jong ki jaidbynriew kiba don ha ki Jylla bapher bapher kiba kane ka article ka treikam.
3. Ki Jylla kiba don ha ka thain Shatei Lam Mihngi kiba lah ioh ia kane ka article ki long ka Jylla Nagaland ba lah tip kum ka Article 371A, ka Jylla Assam kum ka Article 371B, ka Jylla Manipur kum ka Article 371C, Ka Jylla Sikkim kum ka Article 371F, ka Jylla Mizoram kum Ka Article 371G. Ka Article 371A bad 371G ki long kita ki Khyrnit kiba ka Seng HSPDP ka dawa na ka Sorkar Kmie lyngba ka Sorkar Jylla. Ha kine ki khyrnit ka Seng ka iohi ba ka don ia kita ki jubab (solution) ia ki jingeh kiba bun kiba ngi lah mad bad ban dang iai mad ha ki sngi bad ki snem ki ban wan.
4. Ban kham iashai bad sngewthuh, la bsuh ia ka Khyrnit kaba 371A hapoh ka Riti Synshar jong ka Ri India da kata ka Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) act, 1962 bad kaba treikam pat naduh ka 1 – 12 – 1963. Ia ka Khyrnit kaba 371F la bsuh da ka Constitution (Thirty-Six Amendment)Act, 1975 bad kaba treikam naduh ka 26-4-1975. Ka Khyrnit kaba 371G ka lah treikam naduh ka 20-2-1987 hadien ba lah bsuh ia ka hapoh ka Riti Synshar jong ka Ri da ka Constitution (Fiftythird Amendment) Act, 1986.
5. Ka Seng ka sngewthuh shai ba hadien ba la bsuh ia ka Paragraph 12-A hapoh jong ka Sixth Schedule da ka Assam Reorganisation(Meghalaya) Act, 1969 bad pynbud ruh da ka North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act 1971, ka bor jong ka Sixth schedule ha kane ka Jylla jong ngi ka kylla tlot bor noh. Kumta ngi donkam kyrkieh ia ka Article 371 ba kan ai jingiada kyrpang ia ngi kiba long ki traishnong jong kane ka Jylla.
6. Kumno kane ka article kan pynmyntoi ia ngi kum kata ka jaidbynriew kaba kyrpang? Lyngkot eh, halor kane ka bynta la sngewdei ban ring ia ki jingmut jingpyrkhat jong baroh lang sha ki artylli ki Jylla kiba don sha kane ka thain Shatei Lam Mihngi, kita ki long ka Jylla Nagaland bad ka Jylla Mizoram kiba lah ioh ia ka bor lyngba kane ka Article. Dei hangne kein ba ngi dei ban tip ba ka Jylla Nagaland kam don ia ka District Council bad kumjuh ruh lah pyn duh noh ia ka District Council ha Mizoram lyngba ka para 20A jong ka Sixth Schedule laitnoh tang hapoh Ka Chakma District. Ka jingkylli kaba mih mynta ka long balei pat ka Jaidbynriew Naga bad Mizo ki khlain bad ki paw bha ha kine ki sngi kiba mynta wat haba kim don ia ki Autonomous District Council?
7. Ngim lah ban len ba ki Autonomous District Council(ADC) ki long kiba donkam na ka bynta kito ki Jaidbynriew Riewlum kiba ym pat ioh ia la ka jong ka Jylla khnang ban iada kyrpang ia ki na kata kaba ki ong ka Sorkar Nongwei, ka bym tip ia ki Riti ki Dustur jong ki. Kum ka Jaidbynriew Khasi ngim dei ban klet ba ngi lah dep ban ioh ia la ka jong ka Jylla naduh u snem 1972.

Ka jingkyntu ha kane ka por ka long ba ngin ieng ryntih kum ka Jaidbynriew ban pynioh ha ki longdien jong ngi ia kane ka bor kaba kyrpang ba lah pynkupbor lyngba kane ka article kaba 371 jong ka Riti Synshar ka Ri India ban iada katkum ki kyndon jong ka ain ia ka hok longtrai jong ka Jaidbynriew Khasi kum ba ia long lem kiwei ki Jaidbynriew Riewlum kiba don ha kane ka thain Shatei Lam Mihngi.

click hangne ban ioh pule ia kaei ba i Bah Bindo Lanong i don ban ong halor ka article 371

The post Khnang ba ki paidbah kin sngewthuh shai kaei kata ka article 371 appeared first on RAIOT.

I

The first-ever Earth Summit
was given a big build-up for weeks,
almost like the death of Rajiv Gandhi.

In Rio
the world talks
of global warming
the ozone layer
pollution
and eroding rain forests.

At Nan Polok
the parking lot
humbles down
hundreds of our proudest
pines.

II

There was a parking lot in Shillong
that took a year and crores to build.
Why, I asked, was it not used to ease congestion?
It awaited the Minister for Roads to inaugurate,
who awaited the fall of his government.
And the waiting goes on,
for here they change parties and governments
like Hindi film stars changing dresses in a song.

The post The Parking Lot appeared first on RAIOT.

The ruling dispensation has successfully cleared the passage to the Citizenship Amendment Bill days ago on its second attempt and that now has become a legal constitutional Act. When it was initially pushed in January 2019, it was vehemently opposed and the Indian parliament could not clear the passage to the bill then. The most vociferous opposition comes from the people of India’s frontier region ‘North-East’, rather than its ‘heartland’. Today Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya have been paralysed by protest since the Indian Parliament cleared its passage. Three people have been killed in Assam, curfews imposed in parts of Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya and extra troopers have been called in.

Since the initial introduction of the bill, it has been a subject of concern, both at the regional level and at the ‘heartland’ of India. But the concerns over the new Citizen Act by the two have been entirely different and the discourse at the ‘heartland’ has been continuously belittling the issue of the region which in-fact is the core of politics in the region. The belittling of the region and its people is not new, in-fact during the first Indian parliamentary election the princely states of Manipur and Tripura were not allowed to exercise adult franchise, they were made a Part C State governed by a Chief Commissioner appointed by the President of India, and the reasons cited then by BR Ambedkar, the premier of India’s Constitution was that the inhabitants are “tribal”, “uneducated” and “backward” and the states having no “authority” or “local bodies”. All these while he had no clue of the 1948 elections in Manipur under the Manipur Constitution Act 1947 before its ‘merger’ with the Union of India. This is where I feel that I should speak. I will speak the language of the indigenous people in the region who are on the streets now and not mumble some convenient politically correct appeasing statements which will fit the ‘mainstream discourse’, I have no one to appease from the ‘heartland’ of India. In short, I will be honest to myself and to the people I speak for.

The suspicious orient(s)

The region often projected as ‘complex’ social-political terrain is home to more than two hundred unique trans-border ethnicities with sizes varying from a few million to some few hundreds. Catering these range of ethnicities within the logics of a modern ‘nation-state’ has been an ‘issue’ since the British colonial times till today under the Union of India. Witnessing identity based struggles in this region is not uncommon with struggles ranging from secession from India to autonomy within the Indian Union. With the Indian nationhood’s inability to travel beyond the Chicken Neck, historically the relation of the region with the Union has been bitter and contested, and it remains the same till today. With mistrust and suspicion by the then rulers of India the large portion of the region was “taken over” as a territory of the Union. The (in)famous response “Isn’t there a brigadier in Shillong?” by the then Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel from his death bed when the report of the native state Manipur’s reluctance to join the Union reached his ears resonates the mind of the people in Manipur till today. Further, Patel also saw the North-East frontier as “troublesome” and a “weak spot” to India’s security with reference to China, inhibited by people with “pro-Mongoloid prejudices” having no “established loyalty or devotion to India”, and hence the approach to the region till today has been from the radicalised lens of India’s strategic security, a frontier “taken over” to protect its ‘heartland’. The region today is a radicalised frontier territory and its large part ruled by extra constitutional legislations which put the entire populations as “suspects” and potential troublemakers. “Shoot at suspicion” is the ‘rule of law’ in the region and a “state of exception” prevails.

The demographic politricks

With the ‘strategic security’ approach to the region inhibited by people with “pro-Mongoloid prejudices”, the biopolitics towards the region includes the intention of demographic changes by its rulers from Delhi. This is apparent from the statement made by a then parliamentarian after India’s humiliating defeat in the Indo-China war that “half a million of farmers from Punjab” be settled in the present day Arunachal Pradesh; and the reluctance of Delhi to address the Bangladeshi immigration issue in the region points towards the intent of Delhi’s demographic designs in the region. The unabated influx from Bangladesh in the region since partition has been a crucial issue, particularly Assam and Tripura. As a matter of fact the Assamese nationalism is premised from the Bengali domination in the colonial and post-colonial period and has been the core of the politics in Assam. These two states have been taking the maximum ‘burden of partition’ in the region which was the result of the politics beyond the Chicken Neck. With no concrete policies for refugees in India, legal scholars have even questioned the legality of ‘sharing the burden’ in the region when states like Manipur was not even a part of India when the partition happened.

Tripura today is a settler colonial state ruled by the immigrants pushing the Indigenous Tipras to fringes. When one says partition and the subsequent exodus of the people, it is not a one time event, but rather a trail of human migration which continues for a long period and probably continuing till today. The situation in Tripura has reached to the level where the policing of the indigenous population during an indigenous uprising is done by the civilian Bengali settlers themselves. Even today, aftermath the amendment of the Citizen Act, reports are coming in that some Tipra settlements are hiding in the jungles for their safety from the violence of the Bengali settlers.

It will be naive to assume that the burden of partition is borne by Assam and Tripura only in the region. The settlements in Dimapur in Nagaland, Jiri in Manipur is testimony to it and the rest of the states have its own share. Beyond the Bangladesh immigration issue, many ethnicities in the region do not welcome the migrants from India’s ‘heartland’ coming and settling in their respective ‘homelands’, as they also pose the same threat to the ethnic minorities. The threat perception towards the people from India’s ‘heartland’ is no less than that of a Bangladeshi, as a matter of fact Bangladesh was also India once. The past people’s movements in Meghalaya and recent one in Manipur for legislative protection for the indigenous people is testimony to it. With no objective constitutional conceptualisation of indigenous people and ethnic minorities in India and lack of concrete protective policies in place for the indigenous people in the region, and no policies for ‘sharing the burden’ of partition, the region is open to settle by ‘outsiders’ paving the way to its decay. The fear and anxiety by the ethnic minorities in the region is never an ‘imagined’ one. The region records of having low birth rates but the decadal population growth rate is much larger exceeding most of the decadal counts from the national average, which obviously is due to the migration in the region. Any minority ethnicity in this situation will obviously feel threatened.

The new Citizenship Amendment Act and the dissenting ‘North-East’

Partition was an event which happened beyond the reach of the politics in the region. But its political repercussions is far-reaching, the region is not left out from its effects. Both the Indian National Congress (INC) and Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) have played their share of politricks out of it. The BJP, partnered with many small regional parties in each state having its own agendas, came and formed the government in the region taking up the issue of immigration and protection and development of the Indigenous people and their rights and importantly using the anti incumbency sentiments towards the INC. In Assam, they promised to implement the Assam Accord 1985 “in letter and spirit” which the party itself violated days back. The BJP back stabbed the people of Assam and the North-East at large.

The reading of the dissent in the region against the new Citizen Act is in the context of Assam Accord of 1985 and the National Register of Citizen (NRC) exercise in Assam which is an outcome of the Accord signed to identify non Indian citizens. Assam is the only state in Indian Union which is conducting an NRC exercise. The exercise started in 2013 only under the scanner of Supreme Court of India. In a 1979 parliamentary by-poll in Magaldoi, Assam, people witnessed an unusual rise of voters and it was suspected that the rise was due to the influx of Bangladeshi immigrants. It sparked the most violent protest in Assam popularly called the Assam Agitation spanning over six years killing a total of 885 persons. It is also in this context of uprising, the armed group United Liberation Front of Assam was founded which continues its armed struggle for a “Swadhin Asom”. The half decade long uprising was finally concluded in 1985 with the signing of a Memorandum of Settlement: the Assam Accord, with the Government of India (GoI) under the prime ministership of Rajiv Gandhi and the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGP) as peoples’ representative of Assam. On a similar line in 1980, in Manipur, the All Manipur Students Union (AMSU) and the All Manipur Students Co-ordination Committee (AMSCOC) launched a violent agitation against the foreigners and migrants from India’s ‘heartland’ where two students were killed. An agreement was reached with the Government of Manipur (GoM) and the student bodies with an agreement signed in July 1980.

The principle clause of the Assam Accord was the “detection and deportation” of foreigners and the cut off date set for citizenship was the midnight of 25th March 1971. Any foreigners regardless of religion entering into Assam after the cut-off date was to be detected through NRC exercise and deported. And for the agreement in Manipur the base year was 1951 and “detection and deportation” of foreigners was also part of the agreement which was never materialised. The newly amended Citizen Act by setting the new base year for citizenship in India to December 2014 even though exclusively for Hindus completely contravenes the primary clauses of the Assam Accord and the agreement between AMSU, AMSCOC and GoM thereby giving passage for citizenship to the majority of the foreigners recently identified by NRC in Assam. This is the bone of contention and the source of current unrest in the region.

Our blood is not your brownie points!

Much has been talked of the region not being represented the in the mainstream discourses be it cultural or political, even PhD theses have been written on this subject. I agree to it at some point, but there is also representation(s) to an extent, the problem with it is that whatsoever is represented has been a misrepresentation of the people in the region. Dilution, defilement, belittlement have been the nature of the so called representation(s) be it on our culture, identity or politics. The narratives on culture, identity, and politics from the region do not fit their conscience, it has to be tweaked to fit their conscience. This act of mis-representation is a conscious act of violence towards the people of the region by the dominant mainstream. A violence operational at the level of discourse. This violence on discourse justifies their dominance. We are, through their discourse(s) fixated into the categories of “Anti-state”, “violent”, “unruly” “barbaric”, “not liberal”, “xenophobe” etc etc and so on.

When the news of the preliminary list of NRC list started coming with a slight indication of majority muslim Bangladeshis being on the verge of declaring foreigners and ‘stateless’, the debates and opinion pieces in media and comments by civil and political bodies in the ‘heartland’ of India was quick to conclude the exercise as “islamophobic”, “anti-secular” and “undemocratic”. Some even went to the extent of demonising the people of ‘North-East’ by condemning them as “xenophobic”, without having a slightest clue of the historicity of the exercise and the concerns of the indigenous people in the region. Later when the final list was published nearly two million people were announced as foreigners or non Indian citizens. Many were not satisfied with the final list. For the Assamese people the digits were less and for the BJP the huge chunk of the declared foreigners turned out to be Hindus. This is where the newly amended Citizen Act saves the agenda of BJP. The Act sets the cut off date exclusive for Hindus for citizenship who have entered India on or before December 2014. The BJP’s intention is to naturalise the citizenship of the excluded Hindus from the final NRC list in Assam while the people wanted to deport the foreigners, be it Hindu or Muslim. This is why the Assamese are agitating, and not because the new Citizen Act is anti Muslim or non-secular. The Act opens the passages for settler colonialism in the region.

With the BJP’s newly enacted Citizenship Amendment Act and plans for a pan Indian NRC, the targets towards the Muslims of India’s ‘heartland’ have been sending anxieties to Indian ‘liberals’ and ‘secularist’ who are vocal against the current ruling party. By relegating the cries of the North-East region to fringes, a strong and powerful ‘liberal’ discourse on ‘secularism’ has emerged in India’s ‘heartland’. One can clearly observe the immorality of this discourse; news reports, opinion pieces announce the new Citizen Act as “islamophobic” and “anti-secular” while using images from the protesting ‘North-East’. One will also find news reports where images are used from the current Assam protest and the news item never mentions the protest in Assam and its reason but talks of passing an “Anti Secular Bill”. Deaths of protesters in Assam is cited in making their ‘liberal’ ‘secularist’ arguments in news rooms and opinion pieces. Slogans like “no to NRC” is coming out from Ganga Dhaba/Jantar Mantar protesters while the entire region of North-East wants an NRC or similar exercise. While the BJP has completely annihilated the Assam Accord and the aspirations of indigenous people of ‘North-East’, the ‘liberals’ and ‘secularist’ have done no less than the BJP by muddying the entire issue at hand. BJP has killed the indigenous people of ‘North-East’ and Indian ‘liberals’ and ‘secularist’ are scoring brownie points in their liberal spaces through the blood shed in the region! This is the immorality of India’s ‘heartland’ be it left, right or centre!

The post You Don’t Get North East of India! appeared first on RAIOT.

Mr. Mantre Passah and Rev. Kyrsoibor Pyrtuh, who have been part of progressive people’s movements and part of collectives including Thma U Rangli-Juki (TUR) and Workers Power of Meghalaya (WPM), have filed a PIL in the Supreme Court of India on the 13th of January 2020, challenging the constitutionality of the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 (CAA) which has been notified in the gazette by the Central Government on 10th January 2020. Their challenge bases on the arbitrariness of CAA and its attack on the freedom of religion, reality of transborder tribal lives and privacy of individuals. They are being represented in the court by a group of lawyers whose knowledge of the constitutional jurisprudence is well respected in the legal circles. The group includes Mr. Gautam Bhatia, Vrinda Bhandari, Malavika Prasad and others. You can read download the original petition here and also read a statement by the petitioners below.

A Short Statement about the Petition by Mantre Passah & Rev Kyrsoibor Pyrtuh

We are challenging the said Act because it attacks the fundamental rights of the individuals belonging to the tribal communities, with respect to their persecution as a trans-border tribal community as well as their status in neighbouring countries, including the Khasi-Pnar, Garo and other smaller tribal communities here in the state of Meghalaya bordering the country of Bangladesh.

First, that the said Act fails “to take into account the lived realities of the inhabitants of those border regions, many of whom follow indigenous religions and do not identify as being of a part of any of the six selected religious communities”. This is a blatant design of creating a divide among the various tribal communities, especially those who follow the indigenous traditional belief system like the Niam Tynrai and Songsarek (which are distinct belief systems and are not part of any mainstream religion like what certain elements want us to believe), followers among the Khasi-Pnars and Garos, who do not fall under any of the religions mentioned in the CAA (Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian).

It must be understood that historical factors like the drawing up of borders during the Partition of India as well as colonial British policy have played a role in affecting the relationship and connections of these tribal communities. This Act fails to to take into account this fact in addition to being arbitrary and motivated by religious discrimination. That is why we as the petitioners feel that this Act is clearly motivated by insidious thinking and planning of the present ruling regime, the Hindutva ideology of which is based on the belief of Hindu majoritarianism and supremacy in the nation state of India, and which treats minorities, religious or otherwise, as secondary.

The original Citizenship Act, 1955 was enacted on the same principles as the Constitution, and no religion based requirements or conditions were imposed for the acquisition of citizenship. “The impugned Act violates the right to privacy of refugees belonging to indigenous tribes following traditional religions and imposes unconstitutional conditions upon them.” That is why we the petitioners believe that the Act does not stand scrutiny as it does not follow the constitutional principles of secularism and equality and that it “should not enact a binary of citizens and illegal immigrants, but ought to recognise the layered and complex character of migration, as well as the identities of those who migrate”, the government should also “respect the legitimate concerns of indigenous citizens, who inhabit border states, with respect to the preservation of their language, land, and culture (a principle already recognised in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and in the judgments of this Honourable Court).”

We the petitioners would also like to highlight that “the… Act and… provisions would impact various persecuted tribal communities in countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar, including members of the Chakma, Hajong, Rabha, Khasi and Garo communities.”

Therefore, we the petitioners request the Supreme Court to exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution in order to issue guidelines for a just, fair, and equitable immigration regime, until such time that Parliament sees fit to enact a constitutionally valid law. In addition to the unconstitutional legal aspects of the CAA, we would also like to highlight the manner in which the CAA has been brought about by the NDA government and the prevailing atmosphere of fear that this Act and its passing has created in the country as a whole and here in the North-East of the country. Religious minorities all over the country, particularly that of Muslims and including those who do not profess any religious beliefs are living in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the backdrop and aftermath of the passing of the CAA.

It is our firm belief that the CAA and other legal mechanisms that the NDA government has brought about and those that it is planning to bring in the near future, go against the basic principles and structure of the Constitution including the protections afforded to the tribal communities of North-East India through the Sixth Schedule and other constitutional and legal protections. While so-called exemptions have been accorded to some of the north-eastern states including Meghalaya, which we also contend as pointless, useless and diversionary, that does not wash away the fact that the foundation of the Indian state and its constitution is being threatened by the present NDA regime and its allies, in the Centre and in the states. We need a secular democratic republic with protections for tribal rights and all religions and cultures.

We believe that the struggle to protect our rights as tribals in India can not be divorced from the struggles against a system which tries to create a monolithic India based on religious majoritarianism.

The post Read the Petition Against CAA Filed By Two Khasi-Pnar Activists From Meghalaya appeared first on RAIOT.

Lad Rymbai, Meghalaya: A 27 year old labourer from Wapungskur village in Khliehriat, East Jaintia Hills district of Meghalaya says he is desperately seeking government compensation for injuries he suffered in an accident while working in an illegal coal mine in Lad Rymbai last May. He has not received any medical attention since then.

Siswilfor Dkhar received a grievous injury to the upper thigh of his right leg, which came under the impact of a loose boulder while working inside a 600 feet deep ‘box cut’ coal mine. Instead of rushing him to the nearest hospital, Dkhar said, he was left to his own devices.

Unable to afford medical costs, Dkhar spent four months undergoing treatment from a traditional healer in Mawphlang, a village in East Khasi Hills district. “They applied some ointment to my wounds but it still hasn’t healed,” he said, showing the deep, rotten gash on his thigh. He could only afford to be on painkillers for a month. “Ultimately, it was my traditional healer who told me that I could ask the sarkar (government) for financial help”

On 12 February this year, two police personnel from the Lad Rymbai Outpost paid him a visit at his brother’s place. “They came along with the owner of the coal mine where I had the accident and asked me why I was unnecessarily raising this issue when we can settle the matter here,” Dkhar told me. However, neither the owner nor the police offered any financial help, he added.

Thereafter, he was taken for a medical examination in the nearby primary health centre. On the same day, Dkhar went to the OP and his statement was recorded on camera.

Vivekanand Singh, the Superintendent of Police in East Jaintia hills in Khliehriat, told me that they had received information about Dkhar from a civilian about 10-15 days back. “Based on the complaint, I sent the officer in charge to the village to make an inquiry and later, the boy himself came to the thana along with relatives to give a statement, which was recorded on camera,” said Singh. He said that a suo moto complaint was filed by the police based on the ‘detailed report’ submitted to him by the Officer in Charge. At the time of writing this, I could not obtain a copy of the complaint.

Singh added that while the investigation is underway, the preliminary inquiry into the case revealed that Dkhar was not injured in a mining activity. “He was not a coal labourer and injured his leg long back in a car accident in which his parents also died. Since he could not afford treatment, the wound has flared up and I’m told, has become cancerous,” he said. The ‘claim made by the civilian’, he added, that Dkhar was injured in a mining accident was not found to be true, as ‘he himself said that he was injured in a car accident’.

However, Dkhar maintains that he spoke about the coal mining accident in the video statement recorded by the police. Moreover, he said that the previous accident occurred when he was 10 years old when a speeding truck in Khliehriat hit him. The scar from that accident below his knee, on his left leg, which he showed to me was visibly from an injury several years before.

Dkhar said the mine, which closed down in October, had been in operation since 2018, four years after the National Green Tribunal imposed the ban on all ‘scientific and illegal rat hole mining’ in Meghalaya. Since the accident, he hasn’t been able to go for work and barely gets around with a cane.

After his treatment, he moved into his brother’s home in Musniang, near Lad Rymbai town with his wife and two sons, aged three and one. “My wife has been supporting us but she only manages to make Rs. 300 per week from whatever labour work she can find in the vicinity,” said Dkhar, while he takes care of the children. “After the accident, I became a liability to my in laws’ family. So we had to move out”

On 31 August 2018, the NGT instituted a committee to deal with the issue of restoration of environment affected by coal mining and rehabilitation of victims, who were injured or died while working in the mines. The Supreme Court judgment lifted the NGT ban in July last year but allowed the NGT committee to carry on with their work uninterrupted.

SP Singh told me that wherever claims of injuries received from coal mining accidents were found to be true as verified by the police, those were submitted to the District Commissioner for disbursal under the ‘victim compensation scheme’.

In its sixth interim report submitted to the NGT on 3 December 2019, the committee recommended that the State of Meghalaya should disburse an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs to each of the labourers who received serious injuries while working in an illegal rat hole coal mine. This was accepted by the NGT in an order on 9 January, along with other recommendations of the committee in its fourth, fifth and sixth interim reports.

When asked why it took him this long to seek compensation, Dkhar said that he had not even informed the sardar (coal mine manager) about the accident but someone else informed the police before.

“Three police personnel from Lad Rymbai outpost had come to my place in May last year,” he said. “But they told me that since I was working in an illegal mine, I could not claim any compensation”

First published in the print edition of Imphal Free Press

The post What Happens To Workers in the Illegal Coal Mines of Meghalaya? appeared first on RAIOT.

Saddened and angered by riots/pogroms in Delhi, some concerned citizens and organisations of Shillong gave a call for a All Faith vigil Against Majoritarian Hate on Friday, 28th February. Many responded. Speakers, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, prayed their pains and frustrations at the full blown Hindutva fascist times we were living through. But as Angela Rangad of TUR pointed out, that the same process of othering and targetting which underpinned the Hindutva fascist project also had its resonances in Meghalaya’s own backyard. To stand up against violence and hate in India should also mean standing up to such ideas in Meghalaya too. Other speakers, such as Rudy Warjri, Rev. Nathan Diengdoh & Rev. Kyrsoibor Pyrtuh appealed for a new coalition of citizens in Shillong and elsewhere who would defend pluralism and understanding amongst communities. But it was Caldwell Manners, a Khasi documentary photographer and peace activist who brought it all home.
While the vigil was ending, news started filtering in about the conflict in Ichamati near Shella, Meghalaya between the non-tribal residents and the activists and supporters of Khasi Students Union, leading to the death of Lurshai Hynniewta, a Khasi, of Sohra. The curfew was imposed, mobile internet shut down, amidst the fears of violence and counter-violence. Next morning, Rupchand Dewan, a non tribal shop assistant in Iewduh, succumbed to a stabbing spree in the market, eight others were injured. Caldwell’s speech came back to haunt us.
Curfew continues. 

Thank you for coming out.

This gathering, this plurality of people, is a response to bigotry, hatred, violence, exclusion and fear. Thank you for taking a stand. Thank you for showing up. We are here to respond in love, in compassion, in dialog, and nonviolence.

The violence we witnessed in Delhi, the violence we witnessed in the country over these last few months are not isolated events that happened “spontaneously” like the government would like us to believe.  These are events orchestrated by a cultural shift toward a politics of hate. When I say “Politics” I don’t necessarily mean electoral politics, even though that can be a part of it. By politics I mean the arrangement of power. The discourse of hate and suspicion backed by the brutality of violence, whicjy has instilled in us a sense of fear. A fear that teaches us to treat people who do not look like me, who do not talk like me, who not believe like me as a threat to my existence. It creates a “us and them” mentality, it creates a hierarchy of of power – and usually it’s a hierarchy that justifies violence, bullying, sterotyping and hate. We cannot allow these ingredients of hate, of exclusion, of supremacy, and of violence dictate how we should live.

We are here because we have had enough.

Enough of the violence. Enough of the racism. Enough religious bigotry. And enough of the exclusion of our neighbours.

I want to call on the Christian community, a majority in this state, to be bold and courageous in denouncing the violence, particularly in our own state.

Everyone has the right to be safe. If you’re from Shillong, if you’re from Assam, if you’re from another other part of India, even if you are from Bangladesh. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SAFE.

If you are Ñiam Tre, Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Sikh, Jain, atheist, or agnostic, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SAFE.

If you are Gay, Lesbian, Transgender – no matter you sexual orientation or gender – YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SAFE.

If you are a child, a woman, a man, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SAFE.

This fear is not only about Delhi. This fear is about Shillong too.

Today we are here because of hope. Because an alternative of love, dialog, respect and nonviolence are possible.

Yes, we are different, we have different beliefs, ideas, and preferences. Yes, there is so much to identify on what divides us, its easier to do that. James Baldwin, writer and activist wrote, “We can disagree and still love each other unless your disagreement is rooted in my oppression and denial of my humanity and right to exist.”

And that is what the authors of the Politics of Hate want us to do. They are banking on the fact that we will keep each other at arms length. That we will be suspicious of one another. That we will look out for our good over the common good. That we will not know our neighbour.

Enough of that!!! We will not allow hatred and difference of divide us.

You might be here today with friends, or maybe alone. But I’m sure there’s someone here you do know. As an act of protest, take this moment to walk up to someone you don’t know, shake their hand, introduce yourself, and tell them, “WE ARE STRONGER THAN HATE!”

Caldwell C. Manners is a humanitarian practitioner who has worked with local grassroots activists and human rights defenders in Colombia and Iraqi Kurdistan to provide unarmed civilian protection, assessing risk, and collaborating with multiple stakeholders to create safe spaces for local change makers. His work as a documentary photographer and communicator attempts to resist the cynicism that can arise when one is exposed to atrocities, inequality, or injustice every day. He currently is the Communications Coordinator for the Christian Peacemaker Teams, a violence reduction organisation that supports local nonviolent change makers to challenge systemic roots of oppression and violence in their work of liberation. He has a Masters of Divinity (2008) from Anderson University, Indiana, United States of America.

The post Standing Up To the Politics of Hate & Violence in Meghalaya and Delhi appeared first on RAIOT.

This statement (originally in Khasi) was endorsed by more than 130 Khasi citizens of Meghalaya. If you are from Meghalaya and want to endorse the statement, message or WhatsApp on +91-9863097754. 

We are living in a time of darkness in India as well as our state of Meghalaya, amidst violence and killings of hate.

We live under the shadow of the Citizenship Amendment Act., 2019, a law which has created an atmosphere of hate and is dividing the citizens in our society and various communities. And this has only gotten worse with the recent incidents of violence in Delhi, and closer to home, here in Meghalaya.

The violence which led to the deaths of Lurshai Hynniewta, Rupsang Dewan, and Ussaduddin, as well as various attacks and stabbings, at the hands of hatemongers and criminals shows a complete lack of remorse and lack of understanding over the value of life. The loss faced by their families is irreconcilable. Yes, the police has managed to arrest some of the perpetrators, but there are many more perpetrators who are on the loose and this threatens others and the overall peace and order in our state.

Meghalaya is faced with many difficulties, as well as opportunities and hope. The population of the indigenous people here is small in comparison with India at large, and they need protections, whether it is their land and resources, languages, their indigenous land systems and sacred forests, their traditional governance, like the Dorbar Shnongs and Himas, and several others. Whether these protections can be achieved only through violence and bloodshed? Through the propagation of hate? Whether we cannot think of other ways to protect ourselves? Yes, sometimes laws are passed that threaten us, and also the movement and entry of people from outside the state also makes it seems that our existence in the face of the earth is threatened; can violence and bloodshed be the only solution? The saying, “An eye for an eye” will not lead us anywhere, it will only blind us and our communities. And as enlightened citizens, we should not accept this and understand that even history teaches us that this philosophy of hate and violence will only beget more hate and violence. Therefore, those who murdered Lurshai Hynniewta, Rupsang Dewan, and Ussaduddin; those who assaulted people are nothing more than criminals and violent opportunists who should be caught immediately and punished as per the provisions of law.

What happened in Ichamati on the 28th of February 2020 and the subsequent assaults and stabbings, and hate mongering would only lead to a cycle of more hate and violence and would protect no one. All this would only create an atmosphere of hate and continue to create problems, not just now but to future generations.

We have our traditional institutions like the Dorbar Shnong from the bottom to the Raij, the Hima, to the District Councils, and to the Legislative Assembly. Let us strengthen these institutions and their democratic principles and expand ourselves and our thinking. We should mould and improve our governance structures that it benefits all sections of society, whether female or male, young or old and that governance, trade and commerce and others should be inclusive to all on the principle of equality before the law.

Differences will always exist amongst the citizens, in the country, or here in our state. And that should be our strength rather than seeing differences. We have different religious practices and different festivals celebrated across all cultures. We also have in our state different religious traditions, clan groups, and a multitude of different groups; this should be a matter of pride that this plurality exists. We should not let hate divide this plurality and create an atmosphere of fear in our state.

The problems which face us today, in the state and in the country, should be sorted out through democratic means and dialogue. And even if there are disagreements, the democratic right to protest and disagree should be protected along with the fundamental right of freedom of speech which entails the right to criticise as well. No matter our differences and disagreements, we should not let hate take over.

What happens next? Whether to continue with hate which leads to unnecessary violence and bloodshed? Whether we should let hatemongers and violent opportunists to take advantage of this atmosphere? We need to come together and unite, unite against fear, hate, violence and bloodshed. We should unite together for the future. We should fight hate with love, fight blades and iron rods with dialogue and arguments.

Therefore, we the citizens of Meghalaya and India come together and condemn the violence which has led to loss of innocent lives and that all those involved should be booked under the provisions of the law, and also appeal to all individuals and groups to stand united against hate and violence.

We demand that an independent inquiry be set up to inquire into the events leading to the violent incidents in Ichamati as well as the assaults and stabbings which took place subsequently in Shillong as well as in other places.

We demand that the Police should not be biased towards anyone and that all involved should be booked as per the law. Also, incidents of violence, including assaults, arson, and destruction to property, whether private or public, have been taking place periodically for the past few months and years, and the police should strengthen mechanisms to prevent such incidents from taking place.

We demand the creation of spaces for public forums and discussions, to debate about the law, to find ways to uplift our people and state, and to preserve our traditions. We encourage fearless naming of important issues that affect the State or the Indigenous people, and to debate publicly and in detail – founded on the fundamentals of truth – ways in which we can protect our own people.

We demand the indigenous and government institutions govern in a corruption-free manner, making sure that our neighbourhoods, towns and cities are safe for all. We demand the institutions execute the law in a just and fair manner without bias, and in accordance to the laws of the land.  We demand the creation of spaces for public forums and discussions in our neighbourhoods, in our places of learning, where the public and students can gather regularly to discuss, to debate and to listen to the perspective and opinions of others.

We encourage the public to not be afraid to stop or to intervene when there is violence and killings – even if it is a small altercation – in order to prevent it’s spread.

We encourage the planting of seeds of mutual respect and love across generations and with one’s own children; and that our love of our own traditions and people should not be greater than hatred of others different from us.

We need to understand the importance that our people will not thrive and grow in isolation. History has much to teach us about this. We have rubbed shoulders with others from different places. There was also a time when we worked alongside others while we stood up for our own. But now we must chose the path of peace and love. We need to struggle against the hardships of our state and dangers our people face with wisdom, with truth, and lawfully based on democratic foundations.  We should not be afraid to speak the truth, we should not be afraid to debate and defend our arguments by finding common ground in broad mindedness. We need to stand together to end the hatred and killing of each other, it only brings loss and death. Enough is enough.

Endorsed (in alphabetical order)

1. Agnes Kharshiing
2. Aiban Dkhar
3. Aiban Mawkhroh
4. Aidan Syiem
5. Ainame Phanbuh
6. Airpeace W Rani
7. Alfrisha Lyngdoh Rani
8. Amita Sangma
9. Andrew Lyndem
10. Angela Lyngdoh
11. Angela Rangad
12. Angelle Wallang
13. Anita Kharmawphlang
14. Arnicia Kharnaior
15. Ashu Iangrai
16. Avanti Mary Jyrwa
17. Avner Pariat
18. Balawansuk Lynrah
19. Banshan Marwein
20. Banshkem Wahlang
21. Banteiborlang Khongmawloh
22. Banteilut L Nongbri
23. Batskhem Myrboh
24. Benjamin Blah
25. Beststar Mukhim
26. Bijoya Sawian
27. Biron Singh Nongbri
28. Bishar Skhemlang Marwein
29. Bitalinda Majaw
30. Caldwell Manners
31. Christopher J War
32. Junisha Khongwir
33. M.Pariat
34. Dabormaian Kharmawphlang
35. Damien Marwein
36. Darilyn Syiem
37. Donkupar Lyngdoh
38. Bhogtoram Mawroh
39. Khlur Mukhim
40. Moses Kharbithai
41. Valencia Myrboh
42. P.B.M Basaiawmoit
43. Elphius Umsong
44. Evangalene Thabah
45. Gertrude Lamare
46. Gideon Gregory Kharmalki
47. Grace C Kyndiah
48. Gracefulness Rymmai
49. H H Mohrmen
50. H Hokid Syiem
51. Harold B Thabah
52. Iamon Syiem
53. Ian Khongmen
54. Iasaid Khongjee
55. Ibundor Ehlert
56. Indashai Warjri
57. Jackie Warjri
58. Janice Pariat
59. Jenita Jyrwa Nongsiej
60. Jerry Lucius Pyrtuh
61. Jobeth Ann Warjri
62. Joel Kyndiah
63. Johanan Wahlang
64. John Kharshiing
65. Jonal Lyngdoh Nongumlong
66. Jonis Kharthangmaw
67. Joy Grace Syiem
68. Juban Lamar
69. K Mark Swer
70. Karen Mihsill
71. Karen Syiem
72. Kenneth Swer
73. Khrawbor Wartde
74. Kitbok Nongkynrih
75. Kitboklang Manar
76. Kynjoh Shaphrang Masynting
77. Kyrshan Thabah
78. Kyrsoibor Pyrtuh
79. Lakyntiew Sawian
80. Lamjingshai O Garod
81. Lamphrang Diengdoh
82. Lamtei Wahlang
83. Lapdiang A Syiem
84. Lavenia Lyngdoh Nongum
85. Leonardo Tongper
86. Lindsay Diengdoh
87. Longnam Wanbiang Kharpuri
88. Macfairson Dkhar
89. Mantre Passah
90. Maranatha Wahlang
91. Marbudlang Lyngdoh Lawai
92. Marwanki Rymbai
93. Mary Anne Pohshna
94. Mary Therese Kurkalang
95. Mayfereen Ryntathiang
96. Melanie War
97. Mercy Kharbasanti
98. Moody AW Lyngkhoi
99. Zambolis Sawkmei
100. B. Diengdoh
101. Neal Lyngwa
102. Neeta Ranee Blah
103. Nobas Nongrum
104. Phyllis Rani
105. Precious Lynshiang
106. Pynshailang Nongrum
107. Queency Pathaw
108. RGLyngdoh
109. Raplang C Marweiñ
110. Rayner Dkhar
111. Ridalin Nongbet
112. Ritibon Shabong
113. Romilan Rajee
114. Roney Lyndem
115. Rudi Warjri
116. Rushwa Lamare
117. Thabah
118. Saihunlang Phanbuh
119. Samanda Phanwar
120. Samborlang Kharpuri
121. Sanjosstar Marngar
122. Saphronia Mawniuh
123. Saralin Kharbudon
124. Seiborlang Rynjah
125. Sibani Malngiang
126. Sonia Langstieh
127. Sophilos Lywait
128. Sumarbin Umdor
129. Synjuk Mon Dkhar
130. Syrpailin Khonglah
131. Tannia Mawthoh
132. Timothy Fedrick Mawkhlieng
133. Venetia Mawlong
134. Verbeena Kyndiah
135. Wancy Passah
136. Wanphaiti Rynjah
137. Wansalan Dhar

The post Let Us All Stand Together And Oppose Hate & Violence In Meghalaya & India appeared first on RAIOT.

Dated: Shillong
25th March 2020

Respected Sir,
First and foremost we express our gratitude to the government for taking several important steps to combat the outbreak of COVID-19 in our state.

As you know that majority of the women folks in our state are also domestic workers who earns their living with a basic minimum income, and even most of them are also single headed.

Sir, with due respect we request the government to also ensure security to the domestic workers population in our state. We have seen that the government has already allotted basic income package for the construction workers under the Construction Workers Welfare Board, and it is an appreciated move indeed.

Therefore in solidarity with the other mass population of the state the domestic workers of Meghalaya also wanted to strongly join hands in the lock down that has been announced by the government but at the same time we are also burdened with a trauma of survival, we really need the support of the government to ensure that we have a free ration and basic income package so that we will be able to feed our children especially at this time of crisis.

Thanking you and looking forward for a speedy assistance from the government

On behalf of all the domestic workers
Smti. W. Kharsyntiew
Advocacy Officer
National Domestic Workers Movement
Meghalaya Region.

The post Domestic Workers of Meghalaya Need Govt. Support to Survive the Lockdown appeared first on RAIOT.

In July 2012, 15 laborers died trapped in a coal mine in the South Garo Hills. This captured the attention of the Guwahati High Court, which directed the National Green Tribunal to look into the matter. This resulted in the infamous “coal ban” of April 2014, though the Tribunal didn’t issue a blanket restriction. It held, rather, that coal mining in the state had to be better regulated before it could be allowed to continue. Coal mining, as practiced in Meghalaya, is a hazardous business. Hundreds of people, some of them children, have lost their health, their limbs, and occasionally their lives scrabbling within the deep, dark, and narrow tunnels of the “rat hole” mines. Rivers have turned toxic, forests denuded, fertile land stripped barren, and the hills are so pockmarked with mines that landslides and avalanches are commonplace. Yet Meghalaya is an impoverished state that depends on extractive industry— revenues from coal and limestone mining constitute the majority of non-tax revenue in the state— and the ban was unpopular and ultimately unenforceable.

In December 2018, at least 16 miners were submerged alive in the East Jaintia Hills, the most notorious coal district in the state. This happened while the Supreme Court was considering petitions to set aside the coal ban, and the tragedy made national headlines. Several disaster response teams were mobilized, and they launched the longest rescue mission in the state’s history. They only found two bodies. The Supreme Court finally called off the rescue in July 2019 and directed the state government to compensate the families of the deceased. Earlier that month, it had handed down a judgement that many in the state celebrated as a victory for mining. In reality, however, the Supreme Court only reiterated the Tribunal’s decision, holding that coal mining in the state would resume once the state government established a regulatory framework that took into account both the environmental degradation it causes and the risks it imposes on mine workers.  Why, then, has the judgement been so willfully misconstrued?

For six years, coal mining in Meghalaya has been illegal in the sense that it violates an explicit decree. According to the Supreme Court, however, it had been illegal long before that, in the sense that it ignored the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, which insists that all mines have to be licensed by the state government. No such licenses have ever been issued by the Directorate of Mineral Resources in Meghalaya. The state government has thus been collecting penalties on illegal coal mining for decades without addressing the underlying problem. For a long time, it was popular perception in Meghalaya that the Sixth Schedule somehow exempted coal mining in the state from central law. Yet this was never the official position, as the response to a RTI petition in 2008 revealed. Asked whether national legislation applied in the state, the DMR’s response was an emphatic yes. It further confirmed that no mining licenses had been issued, but the government did not “disturb” mining undertaken by local people. Why did the state government never enforce a law it acknowledged to be valid and applicable?

A Brief Timeline of Events in Coal Case

The Coal Economy

Coal mining in Meghalaya is technically an “artisanal” activity, which means only that coal seams are so thin and so deep that commercial mining is too unprofitable to sustain. This means that mining land is leased out as smallholdings that are “returned” once the coal is exhausted, with no regard for the consequences on the people who inhabit the dread landscape left behind. Coal dominates the lives of residents long after it has been extracted: a vibrant ecology that once supported farmers and herders and fishermen and hunters is reduced to crumbling hills and polluted springs. Coal robs people of their land and their future— until, in desperation, they know nothing else. Coal mining begets more coal mining, until finally there is nothing left.

Coal mining in the state once was truly artisanal: a small-scale activity undertaken for local consumption. That was until the coal boom of the last few decades, which has made some people so rich they forget anyone else matters. These coal barons are now political barons who hold the state hostage. Understanding how that happened requires a familiarity with how such mining actually works. Land in Meghalaya theoretically belongs to the community, not the state, as do the minerals that lie beneath it. This the Supreme Court recently affirmed. Under the legal edifice established by the Sixth Schedule, land is governed by customary practices, which were meant to be comprehensively codified by the three Autonomous District Councils. They never were.  The resulting chaos has yielded a system ripe for exploitation. Several scholarly studies have demonstrated the alarming privatization of land in Meghalaya, where over the half the population is now landless.

The “community” to whom the land belongs is now a rentier class of absentee landlords, who control their vast coal fields from the cities. Sometimes this is achieved by manipulating the system— by “leasing” mines that officially belong to locals rather than owning them outright— and sometimes by breaking it. Once they have established access, mine-owners typically import labor for the coal season. One study conducted in the South West Khasi Hills in 2013 estimated that 35,000 of 50,000 inhabitants in the area during the mining season were migrant laborers from Nepal and Assam. (The full report of this study, which was undertaken by the North-Eastern Social Research Center in collaboration with Child Aid network, can be found in Volume One of the Citizens’ Report.) The dramatic impact of mining on migration patterns in the region, coupled with the increasing concentration of landholdings and reduced access to common and forest resources, are one likely reason for the deep hostility between “locals” and “outsiders” that has characterized state politics in recent years. The rage is certainly justified, if misdirected. The only people more dispossessed than the people who live on a land blighted by mines are the people who die below it.

Once coal has been mined, it has to be transported, usually to either Assam or Bangladesh. It is here that the state finally steps in— revenue is assessed by the truckload— and it is here that the real money is to be made. The state government receives its revenue at the various state borders and dispatches a quarter of it to the ADC at hand. Money is also exchanged privately: tolls to road and bridge operators, rent to warehouse-owners, bribes to border officials and police offers, protection money to various militias and politicians. Everyone, but everyone, is implicated in the filthy coal economy, and the people who benefit least are the people who own and dig the land beneath which the black gold broods. There are piles of illicit money to be had in the coal exporting business: trucks are smuggled past customs and checkpoints; they are loaded beyond their legal limits and their hauls weighed inaccurately; winding roads are blasted open exclusively for them. After the coal ban, however, the always profitable logistics of coal export bloomed into a shadow economy of mythic proportions.

The Grand Scam of “Extracted” Coal

The NGT banned coal mining in April 2014, when the coal season was winding down. In June, it appointed the Kropha Commission to assess the quantity of coal that had been extracted but not yet exported. According to audit reports, the average amount of coal mined and moved in Meghalaya annually is approximately 60 Lakh Metric Tons. Given the season was nearly over, logically only a small fraction of that amount should have remained in reserve. The committee, however, returned to the NGT with a figure of 77 LMT— suggesting, in keeping with auditors’ warnings, that coal miners generally under-reported their hauls to evade penalties. The NGT allowed this “extracted coal” to be transported, which it assumed would take three months. In the months and years to follow, official estimates of this “extracted” coal climbed steadily, as the chart below demonstrates. The initial transportation interval was also periodically extended for several weeks at a time, first by the NGT and then by the Supreme Court.

In November 2017, three and a half years after the ban, the Supreme Court issued the seventh such order, persuaded by the State Government’s claim that nearly 8 LMT of “extracted” coal still remained in the state. Several RTI petitions were filed in the months after that, none of which verified that number conclusively. An RTI petition filed in May 2018, however, revealed that over 70,000 transport challans were issued by the DMR during the four months following that order, many of them to people who had not identified themselves as miners to the Kropha Committee. Each challan allows for the transport of 9 MT of coal. A little simple arithmetic thus indicates that, by the government’s own account, 1.5 LMT of coal remained in the state after March 2018. The state then “discovered” a fresh cache of 5 LMTs and successfully moved the court for another transportation order. It did so yet again in December 2018, such that it apparently took over two years altogether to transport coal ostensibly left over from a single season of mining.

Beyond that, of course, there is illegal transportation. Local headlines in recent years have been dominated by “seizures” of coal depots that violated the NGT guidelines. Predictably enough, estimates about the quantity of illegal coal seized and/or stored remain disputed. The Meghalaya government alleges that 32 LMT of coal reserves exist in the state; the Katakey Committee, appointed by the NGT, settled on a more conservative estimate of 23 LMT. There have also been innumerable scandals about the theft, counterfeiting, and illicit sales of challan books. As recently as February, the Home Minister was forced to resign his portfolio for being, in the coy language of political operatives, “ineffective at curbing illegal transportation of coal.”

Coal Criminals

Follow the coal trucks in Meghalaya and you follow the money. Agnes Kharshiing and Amita Sangma were doing precisely that when they were brutally attacked by a mob in the East Jaintia Hills in November 2018. The mob was (allegedly) led by Nidamon Chullet, then the President of the Jaintia Hills Truck Owners and Drivers Association. Chullet has been entrenched in the coal mafia for years. In 2012, he ran an illegal market in the Jaintia Hills along with several surrendered militants and was already wanted for murder. He is now a politician with the NPP, the ruling party. The assault case against him drags on, sunk under the weight of an apathetic state, while Chullet is out on bail and appears to be thriving. He was recently publicly thanked by the Chief Minister for his expansive donation to the COVID-19 relief fund. Chullet is by no means unusual. The Citizens’ Report compares electoral affidavits against an official list of mine-owners in Meghalaya acquired from the DMR through RTI petitions. The results are staggering: eleven members of the current assembly are mine-owners, including the Chairman of the Law Commission. So is one of Meghalaya’s two representatives in the Lok Sabha. A similar analysis carried out for District Council members would surely reveal that they have been equally corrupted by the coal lobby.

It is easy to see why coal interests in Meghalaya are so threatened by people like Agnes Kharshiing. They murdered P.N. Marbaniang, a policeman, simply for doing his job— how much more terrifying must it be to be confronted with someone with such a blazing sense of duty and such persistence? RTI activism is, by definition, a plodding enterprise. One soon learns the truth of the saying that the devil lies with the details, especially when the chasm between the law and the reality is so gaping it appears to be an abyss. The ladder across it is constructed laboriously, one patient enquiry after the next. The citizens’ report was built out of a dozen RTI petitions, filed by different people in different times and places and for different reasons. It was stitched together to offer the Supreme Court a complete account of the dilemma before it. In some ways, the court abdicated its responsibility when it ordered the state government to begin enforcing laws it has ignored for fifty years. This simplistic resolution prolonged the open season on mining that has prevailed since the original “ban,” and it has pushed the coal economy even further into the shadows. Yet perhaps the apex court had little choice, for there is no resolving the problem of mining in Meghalaya until we grapple with the perplexing question of regulating land under the Sixth Schedule. It is to that we will turn next.

The post RTI Battles against Illegal Coal Mining in Meghalaya appeared first on RAIOT.

One morning in 2009, the inhabitants of the Umkyrpong in the Jaintia Hills discovered that their village lands had been sold to a coal baron called Donush Siangshai. The village council— the dorbar shnong— had frequently objected to any such sale of their forest lands, which sustained several families in the village. Understandably perplexed, they filed a RTI petition with the Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council. How was it, they asked, that the sale transpired without their consent? The response to their query unraveled into a massive fraud that implicated the former headman of Umkyrpong and several office holders within the JHADC. Fortified by this evidence, the dorbar shnong approached the High Court of Meghalaya, which set the sale aside five years after the villagers filed their first RTI petition. The Umkyrpong case, while successful in its own terms, exemplifies a recurring and more recalcitrant problem: the tremendous challenge of regulating land in Meghalaya, a state with no cadastral maps, few registered titles, and a few too many institutions.

Land in Meghalaya belongs to the people, not the state. It is governed by customary law, which varies across districts (and frequently within them). Interpreting, consolidating, and codifying this lived law is one of the most important functions that the Sixth Schedule delegates to the Autonomous District Councils it created. In practice, the ADCs work in tandem with traditional institutions, such as village headmen and their councils, to determine who owns land and when it can be sold. Khasi law, for instance, recognizes both private land and communal land. Sales of communal land require the consent of the dorbar shnong before the KHADC can grant a no-objection certificate. In the Garo Hills, however, communal land is held in trust by the nokma (headman). In some areas, his consent is sufficient to obtain the NOC certificate from the GHADC required for sale. In others, the nokma first distributes the land, which is then sold privately. Settlement and title disputes are perhaps the most complex in the coal country of the Jaintia Hills, one of the many legacies of colonial rule in the region.

The Old Colonial State

The East India Company annexed Jaintiapur in 1835. The kingdom was loose confederation; the king controlled the lowlands, located in (what is now) Sylhet, while the hills were ruled by tribal chiefs, the most powerful of whom lived in Nartiang in (what is now) the Jaintia Hills. The proximate cause for the company’s intervention was the capture of “four British subjects” on the road between the capital and Nartiang. Relations between the hills and the plains had been strained for decades, partly because of the company’s exploitative monopoly of the lucrative limestone trade, and three of the men were eventually killed in what company courts described as “ritual sacrifice.” This case was made, to quote the historian Gunnel Cederlöf, “a pretext for the Bengal government to dismember Jaintia and take possession of the extensive lowlands north and south of the hills.” The hills, more difficult to control, were left to govern themselves.

British rule nevertheless left a lasting impact on the hill polities of erstwhile Jaintiapur. Formerly royal lands were converted into extensive “revenue” lands, control over which was subsequently inherited by the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ADC in postcolonial Assam. In the mid-sixties, this “united” ADC split into what are now the KHADC and the JHADC. Currently, therefore, the eleven districts of Meghalaya fall under the jurisdiction of three ADCs, and the “revenue” lands of the Jaintia Hills are controlled by the JHADC. The colonial state issued timebound leases to such “revenue” land, on the basis of which it assessed taxes—a process that enclosed common land and effectively privatized it. The JHADC continues this practice, with two significant differences: it issues “pattas” in perpetuity, thereby converting a lease into a landholding, and the land so granted is tax-free.

The onset of British rule also altered local governance in the region. The hill polities of Jaintiapur were decentralized: each village had its chief, its priest, and its council. A group of villages were organized into a district, and a group of districts into a chieftainship or kingdom. The Company’s intervention deposed the highest layer of governance, making everyone further down the hierarchy dependent on the colonial state, which supported village officials by granting them rent-free “revenue” land. This then allowed local agents of the colonial state considerable sway in deciding who got appointed to these posts as well as their responsibilities. One of the most important officials in the Jaintia Hills, for instance, is called a doloi. In precolonial times, according to the political scientist L.S. Gassah, dolois were elected for their lifetimes and exercised complete administrative control over their elakas (districts). Over the course of the 19^th century, however, this shifted: dolois could only be “nominated” by their elakas for three-year terms, and their appointment had to be confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner. This, alongside their fiscal dependence on colonial largesse, transformed dolois into bureaucrats— responsible for policing their districts and ensuring the flow of taxes—rather than political leaders answerable to their people.

The anthropologist Bengt Karlsson has described the even more radical transformation of “traditional” authorities in the Garo Hills. As is generally the case in Meghalaya, Garos are a matrilineal tribe. The patriarchal colonial state, unable to recognize women as political actors, insisted on dealing with their husbands instead, thereby empowering the nokma as the sole decision-maker over lands his wife had previously controlled. In the hills of colonial Assam, thus, some local leaders owed their authority to the colonial state, while others became functionaries of the imperial government more insidiously. In the postcolonial hills of Meghalaya, meanwhile, the Sixth Schedule has added another layer to the administrative hierarchy: the ADCs, which are responsible for appointing, supporting, and adjudicating between traditional institutions. There are now three separate institutions jostling for power on the ground—appointed officials representing the state government, elected members of the relevant ADC, and the traditional institutions of the tribal polity— and the relationships between these authorities form the meat of local politics. This tripartite tussle is particularly obvious in conflicts about the allocation and alienation of land.

The New Shillong Township

The alarming concentration of land in Meghalaya is perhaps the most pressing concern confronting the overwhelmingly rural state. The sociologist AK Nongkynrih argues that the underlying causes for this accelerating trend are fourfold: (i) intensifying stratification in tribal society (ii) land acquisition by the state for developmental purposes (iii) the transfer of land to extractive industry (iv) encroachment of land by non-tribals. All four causes compound one another, a process facilitated by the byzantine administrative framework. This was perhaps most evident in the many conflicts that arose during the development of New Shillong Township.

New Shillong has been in the works for three decades. The second Shillong Masterplan (1991-2011) envisioned the proposed expansion as a way to reduce urban congestion. The first phase of acquisitions, in the early 90s, did not raise much concern. The second phase began ten years later, and several irregularities slowly emerged through RTI petitions. One such petition revealed, for instance, that less than a fifth of the land acquired had been allocated to people who qualified as “tribal” under the Meghalaya Land Transfer Act, which stipulates that land in the state can only be sold to tribals. The rest was distributed to government agencies and “non-tribal” individuals, most of whom work for the state government.

One such beneficiary was the Civil Services Officers Housing Co-operative Society, and a follow-up RTI petition revealed that the society had been allotted 45 acres in New Shillong for the throwaway price of one rupee per square foot. This wide disparity between intent (urban decongestion) and consequence (a subsidized gated community for bureaucrats) eventually made its way to the High Court in a PIL filed in 2012, two years after the Adarsh Housing Society scam in Mumbai made national headlines. The petitioner argued that the land was illegally allocated to the society (because most of its members were non-tribals) and was subsequently sold at a huge loss to the state exchequer. State filings in the case suggest that the loss incurred was perhaps not that bad: the land that had been sold for one rupee had been acquired for three rupees, further demonstrating that the true victims of the transaction were its original inhabitants, who had long since been evicted. The government eventually carried the day with the argument that the Land Transfer Act only required land transfers to non-tribals to be sanctioned by a “competent authority”— which is to say, itself— and that they were in the public interest.

A number of other discrepancies have made their way into public debate about New Shillong over the last decade. One of the bigger scandals, also arising out of RTI petitions, was about the allegation that forged documents had been involved in the original sale of the land to the government. While the title dispute originated between local residents and two individuals based out of Shillong, it eventually spilled over into a broader debate about the division of jurisdiction between the dorbar shnong (which opposed the sale) and the District Commissioner (whose office had registered the fraudulent title deed and then acquired the land). The KHADC, meanwhile, appears to have been left out of the official deliberations entirely. The forgery case remains under adjudication, but the allegations point to deeper dilemmas about how easily the legal infrastructure regulating land can be manipulated to suit vested interests. This is partly because certain basic questions remain unresolved. Is New Shillong being built on land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act? If so, how is compensation to be determined, and who is eligible? Is it, as the state government has argued, simply that private land has been sold to the government and is now being leased from them? Is the government enclosing common land in the process, or was it already private? Who is, then, the ultimate authority in ascertaining the ownership of a specific tract of land? How transparent are the processes through which such determinations are made?

The Trouble with Translation

At the heart of regulatory confusions in Meghalaya lies a fundamental conundrum about recognition and reconciliation: how can customary norms to be articulated in legal terms that are legible to the contemporary state? Figuring that out is the responsibility, and arguably the purpose, of the three ADCs, but the burden of this translation is enormous. Consider, as an example, another tangle thrown up by the saga of New Shillong: the case of Shnong Tynring. Customary law in the Khasi hills, as elsewhere in Meghalaya, is filtered through territorial groupings. Several dongs (localities) make up a shnong (village). A group of shnongs is a raid—common land is referred to as Ri Raid— and several raids comprise a hima (kingdom). Each territorial unit roughly corresponds to an administrative level in the traditional system of governance. Yet these terms can only be loosely translated between the very different lexicons employed by the state and the tribe. When does a dong become a shnong? How are new shnongs recognized? Who settles territorial disputes between shnongs? Can a shnong sell land without the consent of the dongs that compose it?

In the wake of the New Shillong acquisitions, seven dongs within Tynring— a large shnong located close to the urban development that manages the land around it— filed an RTI petition with the KHADC seeking clarity on such questions. The KHADC referred the matter to Hima Khyrim, under whose jurisdiction Tynring falls. Predictably enough, officials in the Hima deflected the questions, arguing that such traditional institutions were not covered by the provisions of the RTI Act. The dongs appealed to the Meghalaya Information Commission, which ruled that both ADCs and traditional institutions were public authorities under the RTI Act. It also held that it was the responsibility of the ADCs to respond to petitions regarding their deliberations and decisions.

The Information Commission’s decision opened the door to everyone trying to understand and document interactions between the ADCs and the traditional institutions over which they have oversight. For the inhabitants of the seven villages, however, it was only one step in a long and seemingly futile legal odyssey. They had filed the RTI petition hoping to use the information they gleaned to argue that the state government ought to compensate them directly for any land acquired from their territory. They wanted to be recognized as shnongs proper, rather than dongs under the control of Tynring’s sordar (chief), whom they insisted was corrupt and indifferent to his people. Their quest took them to nearly every court in the state, right up to the division bench of the High Court. All of them denied the villagers relief. Four years later, relations between the sordar of Tynring and the KHADC had apparently soured, for he was in the High Court again, arguing that he had been unfairly dismissed from his post. The court ordered fresh elections, which he won, and the conflict drags on. The sordar continues to try sell more land; his people continue to resist him. The rule of law, if you live in Tynring, is a ceaseless whirligig; constantly swirling and yet never moving.

Autonomous District Councils are frequently blamed for failures of governance in Meghalaya. Their inefficiency, however, is a feature of the system rather than an anomaly. In seeking to preserve traditional institutions by transforming them, the Sixth Schedule only further entrenched the colonial paradox it inherited. The ADCs it invented—simultaneously accountable to everybody and responsible for nobody— were practically designed for endemic corruption and abuse. Sometimes, as in the case that opened this essay, the legal system works. The RTI infrastructure helps citizens uncover specific illegalities and then the judiciary provides a remedy. More often it does not, because structural inequity cannot be meaningfully addressed in this piecemeal fashion. The eternal liminality of the ADCs also indicates just how indebted our institutional imagination remains to condescending colonial assumptions about tribal peoples and the need to “gently assimilate” them into modernity. The Constituent Assembly’s recognition of indigenous sovereignty was a landmark moment in world history, but it was only half the task. It falls to us now to build institutions that can live up to that sweeping democratic vision.

The post RTI and the Land Question in Meghalaya appeared first on RAIOT.

The Meghalaya RTI series has a success story to report. On 27^th June, the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a charge-sheet against Ampareen Lyngdoh, JD Sangma, and AL Lyngdoh for their alleged involvement in the White Ink Scam, which occurred during Ampareen Lyngdoh’s tenure as Education Minister of Meghalaya. The scam, which occurred over a decade ago, was quite simple. In 2008, the Deputy Inspector of Schools advertised for applicants to the post of assistant teacher in government schools, and a list of selected candidates was issued the following year. Several teachers from Jowai (and later from Shillong and the Garo Hills) then approached Agnes Kharshiing, convinced that the selection process had been tainted by corruption and vested interests. RTI petitions filed by her in February 2010 revealed that the “score sheets” of candidates in several places had been doctored with white ink.

“Whole pages had been tampered” she would later say “the right people who need jobs weren’t getting them. These people had been temporary teachers, and they only got 1500 rupees a month, and yet they were teaching children in these small rural areas because it was their passion. And then they went through the whole selection process, only to find their jobs taken away. For years they suffered, because these politicians were using the search for canvassing and nepotism, but I am so glad they didn’t go down a criminal path or embrace violence but came to me to seek a legal remedy. Of course I had to help them!”

Helping the disaffected and disappointed teachers would eventually prove to be a decade-long quest. Ms. Kharshiing first tried to lodge a criminal case against Ms. Lyngdoh on the basis of her RTI findings. “The RTI is an investigative tool,” Ms Kharshiing explained, “but the FIR is the strength. That is why my strategy included both. The FIR is how we ensure these matters do not just disappear under political pressure—they could not just ignore it. With RTI petitions you can get bogus replies or delay responding, but with the FIR they have to take it seriously.” In her first FIR, back in February 2010, Ms. Kharshiing alleged that Ms. Lyngdoh, while Education Minister, had supervised the alterations at the behest of a wide spectrum of her colleagues, all of whom wanted to ensure that their preferred candidates received the jobs, even when they were thoroughly unqualified to teach children.

Ms Kharshiiing tried to file FIRs on four separate occasions and encouraged teachers who subsequently approached her to file them as well. Her persistent efforts were stymied at every turn, until a group of teachers filed a writ petition with the High Court in October 2011. The High Court examined Mr. Sangma, then the Director of DEME (Directorate of Elementary and Mass Education), who testified that he had tampered with the selection records at the order of Ampareen Lyngdoh. The court ruling also included a list of the politicians and bureaucrats who had made “recommendations” regarding candidates. Finding that sufficient prima-face evidence for “massive irregularities, arbitrariness, and manipulation” had been unearthed by the RTI petitions, the High Court ordered the CBI to investigate the matter more thoroughly.

The CBI submitted its report to the High Court in May 2012. The report “established that the majority of candidates… were appointed in an irregular manner by changing their original marks… in the score sheet after applying white fluid on the original marks awarded by the board and the grand total of the score sheet was also changed in the similar manner.” The report also indicted a broad swathe of the local political class for having influenced the selection process. By this time, however, the matter had been appealed to the Division Bench. The judges transferred the investigation to the state government a few months later, which appointed a “High Level Scrutiny Committee” (HLSC) entirely comprised of bureaucrats from DEME and the Ministry of Education. The court further directed the HLSC to consider the findings of the CBI Report, and to terminate the service of any “tainted” candidates it discovered. The HLSC submitted its report in July 2013, and hundreds of people had lost their jobs by February 2014. These “terminated candidates” then appealed to the Supreme Court for relief.

Meanwhile, Agnes Kharshiing (along with Angela Rangad) continued to try to register a criminal case against Ampareen Lyngdoh for abusing her authority and forging official documents. Finally, in October 2012, a Judicial Magistrate directed Laitumkhrah Police Station in Shillong to register the FIR, and the investigation proceeded in fits and starts until 2016. Exasperated, Agnes Kharshiing filed a writ petition with the High Court, requesting that the criminal investigation be handled by the CBI. The High Court dismissed the petition because of the pending Supreme Court case.

The Supreme Court ultimately returned the case to the High Court for fresh consideration in 2017. The litigation was by then a tangled mess of appeals, writs, petitions, reports, and investigations. As the judge noted then: “the private parties [can be] broadly categorized in three: candidates who were declared unsuccessful… and initiated the litigation in this Court; candidates who were selected in the impugned selection process but whose services were terminated pursuant to the report of HLSC; and the candidates who aspire induction into service, essentially in displacement of the tainted…. Parallel to these civil litigations, a FIR relating to the same selection process remains pending for investigation wherein several other complaints and allegations have been clubbed.”

Patiently wading through the paperwork, the court first commented on the discrepancies between the HLSC report and the CBI report, finding several flaws with the state government’s enquiry. Rather than holding elected officials and bureaucrats accountable, the HLSC focused only on the narrow question of “tainted” candidates. “We have not an iota of doubt,” the court said, “that the exercise in the name of HLSC was farcical and was only a cover-up, aimed at saving and shielding the persons who had, with impunity, hijacked and polluted the system.” Dismissing the HLSC report, the High Court turned to the CBI enquiry, which indicated the sweeping nature of the scam: dozens of letters from bureaucrats and politicians at every level of government “recommending” lists of candidates, resulting in “gigantic manipulations by way of obliterations, insertions and cuttings in the score sheets.” The scale of the corruption, the court held, “could only vitiate the entire selection process.” “Had it been a matter of certain illegality or irregularity of lesser magnitude” the court went on to argue “we might have considered retention of unblemished candidates in the service, but any such exercise would be only giving credence to a process we have found to be fraudulent. This selection process… if allowed to remain even in part, would wreck and ruin the rule of law.”

The High Court thus ordered fresh selections and directed the CBI to investigate Ms Lyngdoh and her alleged conspirators in 2017, seven years after the first RTI petition in the White Ink Scam was filed. While the implementation of the order has hardly been perfect, with teachers being reappointed in some districts without due process, Ms. Kharshiing’s painstaking investigation into the scam demonstrates the power of the RTI infrastructure. The process might be slow, incremental, tedious, and exhausting, but it can be mighty. We can only hope that all the politicians and bureaucrats implicated in this scam will now be held accountable for stealing the future from an entire generation of Meghalaya’s children. In an interview this week, Ms Lyngdoh— now a member of the state assembly— said she had “full faith in the judicial system.” This once, so do we.

The post White Ink / Education Scam : A RTI Success Story from Meghalaya appeared first on RAIOT.

Let me leap-frog the unnecessary baloney and plunge straight into the point. But then again, before I do that, let me ‘walk’ you through a speech delivered by Meghalaya’s Head of the MDA Government on World Environment Day (WED) 2018, exhorting the youth to ‘protect the environment’ by minimising the use of electricity. Chief Minister, Conrad Sangma, had said,

Walked from home to office to celebrate #WorldEnvironmentDay2018 It should be our agenda to reduce our carbon footprints. Our actions today will define the future for our children. @UNinIndia @UNEnvironment @PMOIndia @narendramodi walking to remain fit @Ra_THORe pic.twitter.com/y6cPed4lGv

— Conrad Sangma (@SangmaConrad) June 5, 2018

What a noble tweet indeed! But why didn’t he at least chirp about the colossal carbon footprints of Meghalaya’s mineral-devouring mercenaries? What kind of air are they promising the future generation?

But politics, as they say, is not a landscape; it is a cloudscape, owing to its unpredictability. So when we fast forward from World Environment Day (WED) 2018 to August 2020, circumstances evince that perhaps Conrad Sangma’s ‘atoxic’ grimaces and amiable appearance in fact ‘mask’ an incapacitated, two-faced phoney, who walks only on WED, talks and tweets a lot, but in reality is Janus-faced.

I will ‘expedite’ my point.

On January 15, 2020, ‘The Shillong Times’ had reported, “(There are) more than 20 Coke Factories in Shallang, West Khasi Hills that claim to have valid documents and have fulfilled all formalities and norms before commencing operations through Single Window Agencies.” Please take cognisance of the last three words. On the first day of August 2020, this report was confirmed by none other than Conrad Sangma’s colleague in the government, S.K. Sunn, Chairman of the Meghalaya Assembly Committee on Environment, in a press briefing. The principal point at the press meet was, ‘Since August 2018, coke factories in West Khasi Hills have proliferated; most of them have Single Window Clearance.’ Again, please take cognisance of those last three words. Now let us review what the August 1, 2020 edition of ‘The Shillong Times’ mentioned: “The Meghalaya Assembly Standing Committee on Environment has taken cognisance of the mushrooming of coke factories in the Shallang belt of West Khasi Hills during the last two years as 16 new coke factories were given clearance to by the Single Window Agency.” Those last three words, Single Window Agency/Clearance, reappear again!

In the website of the state government’s Commerce and Industries Department, there is a notification numbered IND. 49/2016/10, dated 18 June 2020, where it is mentioned that the “Chairman” of this “Single Window Agency” is the “Chief Minister” himself. To be fair, Conrad Sangma didn’t implant himself in this Agency. An incumbent Chief Minister of Meghalaya has always been the Chairman of this Agency since the beginning of the world, whose task is to “expedite” and “fast-track” clearances to set up industries in the state of Meghalaya. He can grant or withhold permission based on his and his officers’ wisdom. Thus, any permission given to multiple coke plants, dubitable cement factories, or gluttonous limestone miners since 2018, had to pass through the hands of Conrad Sangma. In the context of 2020, it is judicious to ask, “Are those hands ‘sanitised’?” Because the clearances to establish 16 pollutant-emitting coke factories since 2018 at Shallang, West Khasi Hills, that are relentlessly smoking-up under the pristine Meghalaya sky, had the mandate of the Chief Minister. He’s the boss of this Single Window Agency now. So is he really for the protection, preservation, and restoration of the environment? Or is walking to office the only way he knows to maintain clean and unpolluted air?

As the Head of the MDA Government and this Agency, he and the Meghalaya Assembly Committee on Environment must ‘clear the air’ by answering some questions:

1. Why did the Single Window Agency expedite clearances to a mind-boggling 16 polluting factories between 2018 and 2020 in Shallang area alone? Was any environment-impact assessment carried out prior to that? How much revenue will the state earn from these ventures? What steps will these 16 take to ‘restore the environment’?
2. Did the State Pollution Control Board follow the guidelines of the Central Pollution Control Board by preparing a ‘Zoning Atlas’ [for the uninitiated, please google this] to identify ‘Sensitive Zones’ and ‘Pollution Sensitivity’ of the area?
3. Coke, in layman terms, is a purified form of coal. So, when the NGT had already banned coal mining in Meghalaya in 2014, where is the coal used by these factories coming from? Is rat-hole mining still happening in coal-rich Shallang?
4. To get coke, coal has to be burnt at over a 1000 degrees. What fuel are these factories using? If it is firewood or charcoal, where is the source located? Are any forest areas being destroyed in the process?
5. Coke is usually mixed in concoctions to manufacture steel or cement. Are these factories in connivance with cement and iron ore industries operating in Jaiñtia Hills and Byrnihat? Is there a collusion between these factory owners, politicians, and government officials of the Commerce and Industries, Forest or Mining departments?
6. Was the Chief Minister misled or pressurised by any party MLA/MLAs, businessmen, technocrats or bureaucrats to give clearances to so many factories located in one place? If he was, will he withdraw the clearances as they definitely pose health risks to the people? If he wasn’t, is he willing to ‘quarantine’ himself and let his Deputy take over and order an independent judicial or CBI probe? Will he expedite the matter to a neutral agency for a fair investigation to ‘uncloud the air’? Is this one of the reasons why he vacated his seat in Parliament and jostled his way to Chief Ministership?

These are some questions that demand answers. But will he speak up? Will he clarify how the haphazard establishment of multiple coke plants determine a more “liveable place?” Will he explain his double-tongue approach towards environmental policies of the state? Because his outward soft-speaking self seemingly hides his mischievous agenda. Or will he emulate Prime Minister Narendra Modi who doesn’t address hard-hitting questions? If he doesn’t address this issue then I will lend voice to more questions hovering around Meghalaya’s polluted air such as unabated limestone mining, remorseless timber smuggling to dubious factories, issuing of deceitful transport permits, and others that warrant an explanation from the horse’s mouth.

More pertinently, will organisations like the ICARE, Shillong We Care, COMSO, and other Brave Hearts of the Khasi ‘jaidbynriew’, particularly those in West Khasi Hills, pin the Chief Minister? Or will they sweep it under the rug because coke fetches a better price than coal? Will the Opposition Congress Party dig up this issue or is it knee-deep into this ruckus because something is definitely ‘coking’; I’m not cooking anything up!

Parting shot: ‘A Politician, they say, does anything and everything in his capacity to get elected or gain power and wealth, and is more self-seeking. A Statesman, however, does anything and everything in his power to do his best for the welfare of the people he represents, and is less self-seeking.’ The difference, thus, is unclouded. Just saying.

The post What’s ‘Coking’, Mr. Conrad Sangma? appeared first on RAIOT.

The Meghalaya Govt. has passed The Meghalaya Right to Public Services Act 2020 without any pre-legislative consultation.

The Preamble of this law states that it is

“an Act to provide for the delivery of notified public services to the citizens in the State of Meghalaya within stipulated time limit including liabilities of the government servants, in case of default”

Thma U Rangli-Juki has been campaigning for THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS FOR GRIEVANCE REDRESS AND SERVICE GUARANTEE IN MEGHALAYA Law, draft of which it had submitted to the government in 2013. Sadly, the law to this effect that was recently tabled, The Meghalaya Right to Public Services Act 2020 (MRPSA2020) is a law fraught with the problems of conception and drafting. A Law which is supposed to bring transparency and accountability of the Public Authorities for the citizens was placed in the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly without any pre-legislative consultation. This lack of consultation is now apparent in the draft bill, which in its drafting is full of legal loopholes and is designed to frustrate citizens in redressing their grievances.

IDEA OF PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SERVICE GUARANTEE FROM PUBLIC AUTHORITY

You apply for a driving license but you don’t know when you’re going to get it or whether you are going to get it or not. You’re entitled to a Scholarship, but are not sure when it shall be disbursed? You want duplicate copies of your marksheet but delay by MBOSE is exasperating… So we look for someone we know or try to grease the palms of someone who can ensure that we get the things out from the govt. department. As citizens, our encounters with Govt departments are full of grievances and frustrations. Much of the petty corruption which occurs happens because as citizens we seem to have no right to get timely and quality services from the Govt. departments.

What if all the Public Authorities proactively told the citizens, the timeline for the delivery of services, and also promised that if the services were not delivered on time, the govt servant responsible for such an act would be penalized and the citizen compensated for the trouble? What if as citizens our Grievances about the functioning of Public authority is acknowledged and heard?

A truly effective, pro citizen law about People’s Right to Public Service delivery would be to set up a legislative framework through which any citizen can have their complaints heard, addressed and redressed in a definite time frame. Any administrative structure requires mechanisms by which complaints and grievances can be registered and responded to. Within a democratic framework, where the Government and its functionaries are supposed to be accountable to the people, the redress of grievances is one of the most important means by which true accountability can be evaluated and deepened.

A citizen-friendly grievance redressal mechanism is an essential component in establishing a rights based framework. In case the citizen is unable to access rights/entitlements/services that he/she is eligible to access, there needs to be a time bound and effective method by which a citizen can file a complaint and have his/her grievance redressed. In such a framework the redress of grievances is a positive intervention to not only give the citizen their entitlement, but also provide information to the administration about shortcomings that may exist in the delivery mechanisms. This need is generic and extends to all branches of the administration. Redressal of grievances also requires support structures which are fairly independent from those implementing the program/s. Therefore, an effective and decentralized method of grievance redress is through a well designed Legislation that ensures citizens grievances are heard, registered, addressed and redressed.

PROBLEMS OF THE MEGHLAYA’S RIGHT TO PUBLIC SERVICES ACT, 2020

MRPSA2020 conceives of the interface between the public authority and citizens merely as a temporal relationship, as in that Public Authority are only responsible for timely delivery of services. Although timely delivery of services is an important responsibility of public authorities, but time is not the only thing a citizen seeks. Quality of service and respect for legal entitlement promised by laws and schemes are as important as time bound delivery. Citizens’ grievance is not just that she did not get her scholarship, cash transfer in time but also that the scholarship and cash transfer were adequate and proper. Citizens’ RIGHT TO PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY is both time and quality of the services delivered.

MRPSA2020 does not talk of the quality and entitlement at all.

Implementation of MRPSA2020 is left on the whims and fancies of the governmental bureaucratic structure. It does not for instance mandate that all public authorities shall come under its preview. Only certain services which the government notifies from time to time will come under this law. This is dangerous. For instance, will Mining Department come under this law? Or, PWD’s payment of contractor’s bill or Planning Department or the Tourism Department looking after a rural tourism project? The law is intentionally silent about such questions.

Most glaringly MRPSA2020 is silent about the nature of Public Service rights the public authority have to publicly share. In other similar laws which are in operation in the states like Delhi, such citizens rights have to be put in the public domain as Citizen’s Charters. By omitting from the principal act, the overall framework under which such information about the Rights/Citizen’s Charter, MRPSA2020 is a law with minimal application and is open to executive misuse.

If MRPSA2020 was truly a pro-people law it would have made the frameworks of people’s right to public service/Citizens charter part of the principal act. For instance every public authority had to mandatorily publish

(a) the details of all the goods supplied and services rendered by the public authority and the name, designation and contact details of person or agency through which such goods are supplied or services rendered and timings during which such services are supplied or services rendered

(b) the conditions under which a person becomes entitled for goods or services, and the class of persons who are entitled to receive such goods and avail services;

(c) the quantitative and tangible parameters including weight, size, frequency of the goods and services available to the public;

(d) the qualitative standards of the goods and services available to the public;

(e) complaint redressal mechanism including the time within which the complaint be disposed of and the officer of the public authority to whom such complaint may be made;

(f) the name , designation, contact details and addresses of individuals responsible for the delivery of goods or rendering of services

(f) Those matters deemed urgent that shall be redressed immediately upon receipt of the complaint and in any case no later than 24 hours after receipt of the complaint.

(g) Those matters for which mandatory compensation is to be paid.

Even in its limited scope, MRPSA2020 is not serious in penalising the defaulting officer. Maximum penalty is Rs. 5000 for one offence and Rs.20000 for multiple offences. In times where transport licenses or mineral transportation challans can sell for much more than those amounts, the penalty will not deter corrupt officers and government staff from keeping citizens from getting their entitlements.

Moreover, the fine would be imposed by a State Public Service Delivery Commission, a commission made up of people nominated by The Chief Minister and a Minister of the Government nominated by the Chief Minister himself. This is a recipe for non-independence and a pliant body. It is shocking that the selection committee as envisaged by MRPSA2020 does not even attempt to make itself  a fair and balanced body. For instance under Meghalaya Lokayukta Act selection is done by The Chief Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Chief Justice of the High Court. Even under the RTI Act, Leader of the Opposition is part of the selection process. Moreover MRPSA20202 does not have any process by which citizens can suggest names to a search and selection committee. State Public Service Delivery Commission is in danger of becoming a space for political appointment or retirement benefit for bureaucrats.

Shockingly, MRPSA2020 does not specify how the Commission members can be removed. It is a glaring drafting error. Even if a Commission member indulges in Corruption or crimes of Moral Turpitude, there is no section or clause in the law which will allow that member to be removed.

By centralising the Commission, MRPSA2020 also makes it difficult for citizens to approach the commission. It would have made more sense if the commission was district based.

MRPSA2020 will have to be amended to rectify its drafting and legal mistakes. But TUR demands that such an amendment should be properly discussed and put in the public domain so as to have a law that

1. Brings all public authorities under its purview.
2. Service delivery should include not only a timeframe but quality of services and entitlement of citizens.
3. Citizens should get a right for timebound redressal of their grievances.
4. Every Public authority by law should be made to publish a citizen’s charter and update it regularly. Failure to publicise the Citizen’s charter and update it should also be penalised.
5. State Public Service Delivery Commission should be constituted transparently through a search and selection committee and final selection should be done by a body which includes Leader of the Opposition as well as the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Accountant General of the State.
6. State Public Service Delivery Commission should be decentralised to the district level.
7. Penalty against the Public official(s) responsible for the delay or disruption of services shall also be entered in the service book.
8. State/District Public Service Delivery Commission can also recommend disciplinary action against the official.
9. Citizens’ whose rights as conceived by this law should also be entitled for compensation from the defaulting officers and public authority.

The post TUR’S CRITIQUE OF THE MEGHALAYA RIGHT TO PUBLIC SERVICES ACT, 2020 appeared first on RAIOT.

Mr. Mantre Passah and Rev. Kyrsoibor Pyrtuh, who have been part of progressive people’s movements and part of collectives including Thma U Rangli-Juki (TUR) and Workers Power of Meghalaya (WPM), have filed a PIL in the Supreme Court of India on the 13th of January 2020, challenging the constitutionality of the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 (CAA) which has been notified in the gazette by the Central Government on 10th January 2020. Their challenge bases on the arbitrariness of CAA and its attack on the freedom of religion, reality of transborder tribal lives and privacy of individuals. They are being represented in the court by a group of lawyers whose knowledge of the constitutional jurisprudence is well respected in the legal circles. The group includes Mr. Gautam Bhatia, Vrinda Bhandari, Malavika Prasad and others. You can read download the original petition here and also read a statement by the petitioners below.

A Short Statement about the Petition by Mantre Passah & Rev Kyrsoibor Pyrtuh

We are challenging the said Act because it attacks the fundamental rights of the individuals belonging to the tribal communities, with respect to their persecution as a trans-border tribal community as well as their status in neighbouring countries, including the Khasi-Pnar, Garo and other smaller tribal communities here in the state of Meghalaya bordering the country of Bangladesh.

First, that the said Act fails “to take into account the lived realities of the inhabitants of those border regions, many of whom follow indigenous religions and do not identify as being of a part of any of the six selected religious communities”. This is a blatant design of creating a divide among the various tribal communities, especially those who follow the indigenous traditional belief system like the Niam Tynrai and Songsarek (which are distinct belief systems and are not part of any mainstream religion like what certain elements want us to believe), followers among the Khasi-Pnars and Garos, who do not fall under any of the religions mentioned in the CAA (Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian).

It must be understood that historical factors like the drawing up of borders during the Partition of India as well as colonial British policy have played a role in affecting the relationship and connections of these tribal communities. This Act fails to to take into account this fact in addition to being arbitrary and motivated by religious discrimination. That is why we as the petitioners feel that this Act is clearly motivated by insidious thinking and planning of the present ruling regime, the Hindutva ideology of which is based on the belief of Hindu majoritarianism and supremacy in the nation state of India, and which treats minorities, religious or otherwise, as secondary.

The original Citizenship Act, 1955 was enacted on the same principles as the Constitution, and no religion based requirements or conditions were imposed for the acquisition of citizenship. “The impugned Act violates the right to privacy of refugees belonging to indigenous tribes following traditional religions and imposes unconstitutional conditions upon them.” That is why we the petitioners believe that the Act does not stand scrutiny as it does not follow the constitutional principles of secularism and equality and that it “should not enact a binary of citizens and illegal immigrants, but ought to recognise the layered and complex character of migration, as well as the identities of those who migrate”, the government should also “respect the legitimate concerns of indigenous citizens, who inhabit border states, with respect to the preservation of their language, land, and culture (a principle already recognised in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and in the judgments of this Honourable Court).”

We the petitioners would also like to highlight that “the… Act and… provisions would impact various persecuted tribal communities in countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar, including members of the Chakma, Hajong, Rabha, Khasi and Garo communities.”

Therefore, we the petitioners request the Supreme Court to exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution in order to issue guidelines for a just, fair, and equitable immigration regime, until such time that Parliament sees fit to enact a constitutionally valid law. In addition to the unconstitutional legal aspects of the CAA, we would also like to highlight the manner in which the CAA has been brought about by the NDA government and the prevailing atmosphere of fear that this Act and its passing has created in the country as a whole and here in the North-East of the country. Religious minorities all over the country, particularly that of Muslims and including those who do not profess any religious beliefs are living in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the backdrop and aftermath of the passing of the CAA.

It is our firm belief that the CAA and other legal mechanisms that the NDA government has brought about and those that it is planning to bring in the near future, go against the basic principles and structure of the Constitution including the protections afforded to the tribal communities of North-East India through the Sixth Schedule and other constitutional and legal protections. While so-called exemptions have been accorded to some of the north-eastern states including Meghalaya, which we also contend as pointless, useless and diversionary, that does not wash away the fact that the foundation of the Indian state and its constitution is being threatened by the present NDA regime and its allies, in the Centre and in the states. We need a secular democratic republic with protections for tribal rights and all religions and cultures.

We believe that the struggle to protect our rights as tribals in India can not be divorced from the struggles against a system which tries to create a monolithic India based on religious majoritarianism.

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